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The New Activist Non-Profits:
Four Models Breaking from the
Non-Profit Industrial Complex
MICHAEL HABER*
Twenty-first century activists—inspired by recent social
movements and criticisms of the “non-profit industrial complex”—have increasingly sought to avoid pursuing their activism through the hierarchical, professionally managed
non-profit corporations that have been the norm for social
justice organizations since the 1970s. While many of these
activist groups have chosen to remain unincorporated, some
activists have been experimenting with new, innovative
structures for non-profit organizations, structures that aim
to better align activists’ organizations with their values. This
Article presents four models of activist non-profits: (1) sociocratic non-profits, (2) worker self-directed non-profits, (3)
hub-and-spoke counter-institutions, and (4) swarm organizations. It describes how these approaches increase volunteer participation, deepen organizational democracy, connect more closely with social movements, and aim to maintain accountability among and between organizational
members and other stakeholders. It presents legal con-
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straints on the governance structures of these new organizations and concludes with a description of some best practices
for these groups and their lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION
From the early nineteenth century through the 1950s and 1960s,
American civic life was dominated by membership-led organizations that made little distinction between charity, civic participation,
political activities, religious events, opportunities for socializing,
and mutual aid and support for fellow members.1 For over a century,

1

The earliest colonial settlers of North America formed associations ranging
from large, quasi-governmental bodies to all sorts of local charitable and voluntary associations, including hospitals, fire departments, orphanages, and other
groups. Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, STAT. INCOME BULL. 105 (2008), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf; see THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO
MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE 30–40 (2003); see, e.g., PETER DOBKIN
HALL, A HISTORY OF NONPROFIT BOARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2003)
(ebook), http://beech.ait.fredonia.edu/nfp/ReadingRoom/PDFs/BoardSource-A
HistoryOfNonprofitBoardsInTheUnitedStates.pdf (describing the Massachusetts
Bay Company, a quasi-governmental corporation formed to help govern the new
Massachusetts colony) [hereinafter HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS].
By the 1830s, immigrants new to the United States from countries like Germany and Ireland formed their own social and voluntary associations, and the Roman Catholic Church began a network of churches, schools, orphanages, and
other institutions to serve members. Peter Dobkin Hall, Historical Perspectives
on Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, in THE JOSSEY-BASS HANDBOOK
OF NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT 8 (David O. Renz ed., 4th ed.
2016) [hereinafter Hall, Perspectives]. Women’s groups—commonly focused on
funding missionary work, engaging in local charity, promoting temperance, distributing Bibles, and providing basic education, clothing and shoes to working
children—appeared in towns and cities across the country, often led by the women
of the most prominent local families. ANNE FIROR SCOTT, NATURAL ALLIES:
WOMEN’S ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12–13 (1991) (describing
women’s associations). These associations were so prominent in U.S. civic life in
the 1830s that the French statesman Alexis de Tocqueville would famously write:
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form associations. They have not only commercial and
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it would not have been unusual for a single organization to provide
charity for the poor, promote temperance in its local community,
fund missionary work abroad, sponsor dinners and social events,
support candidates for local office, and provide mutual aid to help
members in need.2 The groups organizing these diverse activities
took a variety of forms: professionals and wealthy elites participated
in business leagues and professional associations; workers joined labor unions and, sometimes, socialist or communist leagues; veterans
joined veterans’ groups; men across social and economic classes
joined fraternal organizations including the Elks, Masons, Moose,
and others; women joined women’s federations and temperance
groups; and African-Americans, Jews, Catholics, recent immigrants, and others joined fraternal, sororal, and religious associations that brought together members of their racial, ethnic, religious,
or other identity group for varied activities and purposes, crossing
later-hardened boundaries between charity, mutual benefit association, civic organization, social club, and political alliance.3
manufacturing companies, in which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, — religious, moral, serious, futile . . . . Whenever, at the head of some new undertaking, you
see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in
the United States you will be sure to find an association.
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA129–30 (Francis Bowen ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., Cambridge Univ. Press: Sever & Francis 1864) (1835).
2
See SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 78, 84–85, 112–13 (describing voluntary
associations as places for socializing, building community, providing charity for
widows and orphans, as well as mutual aid for the families of members, and as
outlets for political involvement); see, e.g., SCOTT, supra note 1, at 13 (describing
varied activities of women’s voluntary associations).
3
SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 173. Skocpol largely overlooks the history of
socialist and communist organizations that parallels the historical rise and fall of
many of these other organizations between the late nineteenth century and the
mid-twentieth century. This ignores the important history of labor and left-wing
political organizations that also faded in prominence in the decades after World
War II. See HARVEY KLEHR, THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM: THE DEPRESSION DECADE 384–85 (1984) (describing how the International Workers Order developed a membership of about 150,000 people, in addition to the membership of the Communist Party USA and the Socialist Party of America, which together had close to another 100,000 members).
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But since the 1950s and 1960s, this universe of civic- and community-minded, multipurpose member-driven organizations has
nearly disappeared.4 There are multiple reasons for the decline of
these groups: suburbanization;5 women’s entry into the workforce
in greater numbers;6 in the case of socialist and communist groups,
the Second Red Scare of the 1940s and 1950s7 and, by the 1970s, a
growing disillusionment with the radical leftist party as a vehicle for
social change;8 the rapid decline of labor unions in the United States
since the 1960s;9 the feelings of anxiety, instability, and financial
4

SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 174 (arguing that “[a] new civic America has
thus taken shape since the 1960s, as professionally managed advocacy groups and
institutions have moved to the fore, while representatively governed, nation-spanning voluntary membership federations—especially those with popular or crossclass memberships—have lost clout in national public affairs and faded from the
everyday lives of most Americans”). There are a few notable exceptions of voluntary groups with local chapters that remain influential to some degree, like the
National Rifle Association and Veterans of Foreign Wars. Id. at 153, 157.
5
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 210 (2000). Following World War II, many white people
left cities for suburban communities, and, with that shift, tended to shift from
commuting by mass transit to isolated transportation in cars, and from public entertainment like going to the movies and participation in civic life to private entertainment, especially watching television. Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at
21; PUTNAM, supra, at 211–14, 223.
6
SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 198–99; PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 194–95.
Women, especially highly-educated women, were an important part of many voluntary associations, both those with all-women members and those open to both
men and women. Id. at 203. As these women entered the private workforce in
greater numbers, national civic organizations lost much of their skilled volunteer
labor and, quickly, their power. Id.
7
M.J. HEALE, MCCARTHY’S AMERICANS: RED SCARE POLITICS IN STATE
AND NATION, 1935–1965, at 6 (1998) (describing the impact of the Second Red
Scare).
8
JODI DEAN, CROWDS AND PARTY 22–23 (2016) (arguing that “by the 1970s
and ‘80s, . . . wide swathes of the Left had become convinced that the party form
was no longer adequate to left aspirations” and attributing this change to “the
stagnation and authoritarianism of the party-states of the former East; the complicity and betrayals of communist and socialist parties in the former West; [and]
the failure of class analysis to address and include the politics of identity, particularly with respect to sex and race”).
9
MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED

2019]

THE NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFITS

869

pressure that increasingly became the norm for American working
families since the 1970s and 1980s;10 a generational shift in interest
away from civic organizations among people coming into adulthood
in the 1970s and later;11 organizations tied to the civil rights movement, feminist movement, and other social movements of the 1960s
moving away from mass-membership advocacy models;12 the rise
of private foundations and the related shift toward the dominance of
more sophisticated, centralized non-profit management;13 changes
STATES 17 (1987) (noting that while some public sector unions have made gains,
there was a “substantial absolute decline . . . in union membership in the private
sector during the two decades from 1960 to 1980”); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN,
STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR 16 (2002) (describing
organized labor as one-third as strong as it was in 1953, and only one-fourth as
strong in the private sector).
10
PUTNAM, supra note 5, at 189.
11
Id. at 255.
12
Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at 21 (citing SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at
136–38). The civil rights movement, feminist movement, and other social movements of the 1960s were the efforts of new alliances between grassroots protesters,
radical activists, and progressive, policy-oriented groups. Id. at 138. Often, the
organizations playing leading roles in these movements “were not membership
associations at all. They were small combinations of nimble, fresh-thinking, and
passionate advocates of new causes.” Id.
13
Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at 19–20. Even before this, Andrew Carnegie, one of the richest men in America, was deeply concerned about socialist
and other radical activism in the 1870s and 1880s, including the rise of labor union
militancy, the national railroad strike, the riots of 1877, and the 1886 campaign
for a ten-hour workday that culminated in the Chicago Haymarket bombing that
killed twelve policemen. Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at 11–12. Carnegie
wrote a series of influential articles in the 1880s that urged his fellow industrialist
millionaires to reinvest their money in social goods to help eliminate this economic strife, writing that these new capitalist elites were men with a “genius for
affairs” who should use that genius to help ameliorate social ills, rather than funding traditional charity. Id.; see ANDREW CARNEGIE, The Gospel of Wealth, in THE
GOSPEL OF WEALTH, AND OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 15 (1901). As more and more
of the new class of incredibly wealthy industrialists formed charitable trusts and,
later, private foundations, it became increasingly common for businesspeople to
dominate the Boards of Directors of universities, private foundations, and the
new, large charities that formed in the early twentieth century like the Red Cross
and Community Chest (which later became United Way). HALL, NONPROFIT
BOARDS, supra note 1, at 18–19; Hall, Perspectives, supra note 1, at 12.
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in non-profit law and regulation that required additional sophistication from non-profit Boards;14 a new attention to the mechanics of
how to lead a successful non-profit, which led to a greater focus on
having education and sophistication among non-profit leadership;15
and the growth of a unique welfare state that increasingly relied on
state-funded non-profit organizations to provide social safety net

14
Groups that were “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of which insures to the
benefit of any private stockholder or individual” had been exempt from tax since
the Revenue Act of 1909, and deductions for charitable contributions had been
offered since the Revenue Act of 1917. Arnsberger et al., supra note 1, at 107.
But by the 1950s and 1960s, a struggle over the business activities of non-profits
resulted in both a liberalizing of state non-profit corporate laws and an increased
emphasis on regulation through the IRS. Id. Federally, through the Revenue Act
of 1950, which limited tax-exempt organizations in their abilities to earn unrelated
business income, and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which created a new regime
of registration, reporting, and accountability for non-profits, tax law created a new
need for tax-exempt entities to hire lawyers and accountants to manage their legal
and fiscal compliance. Id. at 107–08; HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at
21. At the same time, state law began to allow for new business activities. The
influential Model Nonstock Corporation Statute was first released by the American Bar Association in 1964 and “permitted the establishment of nonprofits for
any legal purpose – rather than restricting them to charitable, educational, and
religious” purposes. HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 22. Both in states
that adopted the model statute and in others that were simply influenced by the
general trend toward liberalizing the rules on permitted non-profit practices, it
became increasingly the norm that non-profits could engage in almost any activity
that a business could, except for the distribution of their profits to owners. Id.
Whether a non-profit was seeking to engage in business-like activities to enhance
its revenue or simply trying to continue as a traditional charity in this new regime,
this new regulatory landscape required additional sophistication from non-profit
leadership. Id.
15
During the Great Depression, President Herbert Hoover promoted voluntary organizations and helped to popularize citizen participation in chambers of
commerce, trade associations, service clubs, and other civic groups. HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 19–20. This emphasis led to a new interest in
efforts at educating Boards of Directors to improve their governance, leading to a
“virtual explosion of interest in governance in specialized journals” and a new
focus on managerial professionalism for non-profits. Id. at 20–21.
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services, which led to the expansion of professional staff to manage
those programs.16
By the 1970s, a more centralized and hierarchical model
emerged as the new standard for non-profit organizations.17 The new
model would come to be marked by several common features: a reliance on grants, contracts, and earned income, rather than member
contributions to fund operations;18 a diminished role for members,
or the elimination of members entirely, with organizational direction
set by small and commonly self-perpetuating Boards of Directors;19
a sophisticated, professional staff, led by professional non-profit
managers typically supported by policy experts, communications
specialists, fundraising professionals, and lobbyists;20 a shift in
power from members and Boards to staff as non-profits looked to
business management models in which insider Boards often rubberstamp the decisions of sophisticated employee leadership;21 and a
focus on providing specific services or engaging in advocacy, lobbying, and public education on specific social or political issues, rather than on broadly promoting socializing, mutual support, and
civic participation among group members.22 As this new, professionalized model came to dominate the non-profit sector, it became
increasingly easy or desirable to start U.S. non-profit organizations,
and even as participation in membership-driven organizations dwindled, the number of U.S. non-profit organizations skyrocketed.23
16

Following World War II, the American welfare state began to expand, but
did so not through centralized bureaucracies coordinating universal programs, but
largely through providing funds to state and local programs, direct grants to organizations, and indirect subsidies for charitable giving, increasing the need for
trained managers, skilled in budgets and staffing, and able to meet the complex
demands of external funders. Id. at 21.
17
Id. at 21–22.
18
Id.; James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law
and an Agenda for Reform, 34 EMORY L.J. 617, 665 (1985).
19
See HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 21–22; Fishman, supra
note 18, at 669–70.
20
SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 224.
21
HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 22.
22
SKOCPOL, supra note 1, at 224–26.
23
The number of secular, charitable tax-exempt organizations grew from
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Just as this professionalized non-profit model came to dominate
non-profit organizations in general, it has become the dominant
model for social justice and activist organizations since the 1960s or
1970s, both for organizations that engage in strategic advocacy
through lobbying, litigation, and other systemic change initiatives,24
and for community-based organizations that work to make bottomup change through service provision, community organizing, and
grassroots advocacy.25 But by the early 2000s, grassroots activists
started to become increasingly vocal in their criticisms of the professionalized non-profit model as the vehicle for social justice activism, coming to label the entire framework of these organizations—
from their corporate hierarchy to their treatment of staff, fundraising
models, and lack of robust community participation—the “nonprofit industrial complex.”26 These activists argue that professionalized non-profits cannot meaningfully engage in confrontational
grassroots community activism and politicized service provision
aimed at social change while also fundraising, complying with government regulations, and appeasing grantors.27 They argue that a series of interrelated structural problems doom professionalized non50,000 in 1950 to more than 250,000 by the mid-1960s, and more than 1 million
by the mid-1980s. HALL, NONPROFIT BOARDS, supra note 1, at 21. By 2010, there
were an estimated 2.3 million non-profit organizations in the United States. AMY
S. BLACKWOOD ET AL., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC CHARITIES,
GIVING, AND VOLUNTEERING, 2012, at 1 (2012), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/25901/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief-PublicCharities-Giving-and-Volunteering-.PDF.
24
See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text.
25
Michael Haber, CED After #OWS: From Community Economic Development to Anti-authoritarian Community Counter-institutions, 43 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 295, 307–09 (2016).
26
Id. at 316; SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, FROM THE BOTTOM UP: STRATEGIES AND PRACTICES FOR MEMBERSHIP-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2013),
https://srlp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/SRLP_From_The_Bottom_Up.pdf
[hereinafter SRLP, FROM THE BOTTOM UP]. See generally Andrea Smith, Introduction to THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT
INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 8–13 (INCITE! ed., 2007) [hereinafter THE REVOLUTION
WILL NOT BE FUNDED].
27
Haber, supra note 25, at 316. See generally THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT
BE FUNDED, supra note 26.
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profits to fail in their social justice missions28: (1) their corporate
structures necessitate leadership by full-time, professional staff,
which leads to a need for grant funding that rewards depoliticized
service provision and disfavors mass mobilization, civil disobedience, and public support for issues that could be controversial for
the donor class;29 (2) their reliance on foundation funding forces organizations to shift their attention and resources from organizing for
social change to compliance and appeasing grantors;30 (3) their need
for professional staff to raise funds and satisfy grantors ends up minimizing community control over their own struggles;31 and (4) their
deep dependence on 501(c)(3) tax exemption for building their programs reflects complicity with federal policies that principally aim
to benefit the wealthy and powerful, not low-income communities
of color or other disenfranchised groups.32
The activists launching these criticisms come out of different
contexts, but they are generally connected by a set of three shared
“anti-authoritarian”33 beliefs that have become influential political
values among twenty-first century activists: (1) autonomy, a commitment to freedom and democratic governance, and an opposition

28

Haber, supra note 25, at 316; Smith, supra note 26, at 9.
Haber, supra note 25, at 316; see generally Paul Kivel, Social Service or
Social Change?, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED, supra note 26, at
148.
30
Haber, supra note 25, at 316; see Ruth Wilson Gilmore, In the Shadow of
the Shadow State, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED, supra note 26, at
47.
31
Haber, supra note 25, at 316; see Christine E. Ahn, Democratizing American Philanthropy, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED, supra note 26, at
66–68.
32
Haber, supra note 25, at 316; see Dylan Rodriguez, The Political Logic of
the Non-Profit Industrial Complex, in THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE FUNDED,
supra note 26, at 37.
33
The term “anti-authoritarian” is only occasionally used by these activists
themselves but is a useful label for describing a broad philosophical trend among
social change activists. Haber, supra note 25, at 320.
29
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to authoritarianism and hierarchy, including an opposition to extractive capitalism and authoritarian government power;34 (2) horizontalism, a commitment to opposing and overcoming the marginalization of people of color, women, LGBTQ people, people with disabilities, and other marginalized groups, and a belief that social structures, relationships, and communication must strive to be more inclusive, democratic, and horizontally organized;35 and (3) a belief
that activism must be prefigurative, that the processes used in organizing and building a social movement and its infrastructure must
already be constructing the world they want to see.36
The turn of the twenty-first century has seen a flowering of interest in new conceptual frameworks for social change activism

34

Id. at 322. Anti-authoritarian activists use the term autonomy to distinguish
themselves from the government, corporations, and other institutions that are centralized and hierarchical; the term implies self-organization, direct democracy unmediated by representatives, and the principle that no person, group, or political
party should mandate what another person must do. See GEORGY KATSIAFICAS,
THE SUBVERSION OF POLITICS: EUROPEAN AUTONOMOUS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND THE DECOLONIZATION OF EVERYDAY LIFE 6–7 (2006); MARINA SITRIN, Introduction to HORIZONTALISM: VOICES OF POPULAR POWER IN ARGENTINA 4
(2006).
35
Haber, supra note 25, at 322–23. Anti-authoritarian activists believe that
interpersonal relationships are affected by the power dynamics of hierarchy and
that these power dynamics impact how people relate to one another in their everyday lives. See SITRIN, supra note 34, at 3–4. Horizontalism describes efforts to
structure relationships, both interpersonal relationships and the relationships
among members of an organization or social movement, in ways that fight against
hierarchy so that people can work toward a truer solidarity. CHRIS DIXON, ANOTHER POLITICS: TALKING ACROSS TODAY’S TRANSFORMATIVE MOVEMENTS
88–89 (2014).
36
Haber, supra note 25, at 323–24. “Unlike past [social] movements, social
change is not deferred to a later date by demanding reforms from the state” until
bigger changes can come when the time is finally right. SITRIN, supra note 34, at
4. The goal is to change the world by making changes to ourselves and our ways
of relating to each other, the slow creation of a culture of true democracy. See
DAVID GRAEBER, THE DEMOCRACY PROJECT: A HISTORY, A CRISIS, A MOVEMENT 196 (2013). It is finding a way to “[c]hange the world without taking
power.” See generally JOHN HOLLOWAY, CHANGE THE WORLD WITHOUT TAKING
POWER 10 (2002).
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springing out of a variety of theoretical, political, or practical perspectives influenced by these anti-authoritarian principles: the Occupy Movement and important parts of the Movement for Black
Lives, 37 the solidarity economy movement,38 “transformative” organizing models,39 activist efforts to protect and expand the commons and the related rise in interest in the economist Elinor Ostrom,
known for her analysis of the commons,40 and experiments with libertarian-socialist municipalism and confederalism.41
37

Haber, supra note 25, at 338–45, 352–59.
See Michelle Williams, The Solidarity Economy and Social Transformation, in THE SOLIDARITY ECONOMY ALTERNATIVE: EMERGING THEORY AND
PRACTICE 46, 43–51 (Vishwas Satgar ed., 2014) (distinguishing the “social economy,” non-profits, social enterprises, and cooperatives that “seek to achieve limited, progressive change within the confines of the current social order by ameliorating the effects of market failure, unemployment and poverty” from the “solidarity economy” that is defined by its “transformative vision of society based on
democratic self-management, redistribution, solidarity and reciprocity”).
39
See STEVE WILLIAMS, DEMAND EVERYTHING: LESSONS OF THE TRANSFORMATIVE ORGANIZING MODEL 2 (Stefanie Ehmsen & Albert Scharenberg eds.,
2013), http://www.rosalux-nyc.org/wp-content/files_mf/williams_transformative
_organizing.pdf (describing community organizing efforts that aim to foreground
structural political problems and promote internal organizational democracy instead of relying on transactional concessions on local issues).
40
See DAVID BOLLIER, THINK LIKE A COMMONER: A SHORT INTRODUCTION
TO THE LIFE OF THE COMMONS 14 (2014) (stating that the revived commons movement is important as “a practical paradigm for self-governance”); DEREK WALL,
ELINOR OSTROM’S RULES FOR RADICALS: COOPERATIVE ALTERNATIVES BEYOND
MARKETS AND STATES 15–16 (2017) (arguing that economist Elinor Ostrom,
while not a political radical, “was unambiguously an advocate of deeper democracy, ecological concern and social equality” and that her scholarship on the effective management of the commons “points to a practical politics that can focus
our efforts to change society for the better”).
41
See generally KALI AKUNO & AJAMU NANGWAYA, Foreword to JACKSON
RISING: THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY AND BLACK SELF-DETERMINATION IN JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI, at xiii (2017) (describing the efforts of Cooperation Jackson to develop grassroots municipalism in Jackson, Mississippi); JOHN
MICHAEL COLÓN ET AL., COMMUNITY, DEMOCRACY, AND MUTUAL AID: TOWARD
DUAL POWER AND BEYOND 2 (2017), https://thenextsystem.org/sites/default/files/
2017-07/Symbiosis_AtLargeFirst-corrected-2.pdf (presenting a model for activism designed to encourage the development of participatory community institutions); Alexander Kolokotronis, Is America Ready for a Municipalist Movement?,
38
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These activists do not universally want or need tax exemption or
non-profit corporate entities through which to conduct their work,
but—informed by anti-authoritarian principles, inspired by the
growth of the solidarity economy and commons movements, and attuned to the critiques of the non-profit industrial complex—when
their projects could benefit from incorporation or tax exemption,
they have started to build organizations that reimagine the professionalized non-profit, creating corporate forms that pose conceptual
shifts no less substantial than the mid-twentieth century shift away
from the multipurpose, member-driven organizational model.
The groups adopting these new non-profit corporate structures
share the belief that professionalized non-profits fail to be as open,
egalitarian, or cooperative as they should be, and that groups that
aim to make the world a better place should care about operating in
ways that are consistent with their visions for the world they want
to see. These new organizations face the unique legal, practical, and
philosophical challenges of seeking to remain true to their principles—often including their skepticism about non-profit corporate
forms—while simultaneously navigating the issues facing any nonprofit start-up: how to define their work, how to structure their organizations, how to fund their programs, questions about tax exemption, and concerns about liability and risk. As they have started to
navigate these challenges, these organizations have developed new
models for non-profit structures and procedures, models that turn
away from the professionalized non-profit, both looking back to the
earlier tradition of multipurpose, membership-driven organizations
and looking ahead to a more democratic and inclusive future.
This Article describes four organizational structures for nonprofit organizations that depart radically from the professionalized
non-profit framework. Part I describes non-profits embracing sociocracy, first developed as a practical organizational form at a Dutch
ROAR (Nov. 27, 2016), https://roarmag.org/essays/us-anti-fascism-municipalism/
(describing a model of collective self-governance based on the thinking of “communalist” writer Murray Bookchin, in which directly democratic neighborhood
assemblies provide local coalitions a measure of self-government and leverage
their collective power in a federation).
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engineering firm in the 1970s before coming to influence innovative
businesses and non-profits around the world since the late 1990s.
Part II analyzes worker self-directed non-profits, which developed
out of the recent surge in interest in worker-owned cooperatives and
the broader solidarity economy movement. Part III describes huband-spoke or spokescouncil governance, which grew out of anti-authoritarian political organizing models that become popular among
activists in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Part IV describes nonprofit swarm organizations, a model largely influenced by the tech
entrepreneur who founded the Swedish Pirate Party. Part V describes some of the primary legal concerns for groups adopting these
new models, and Part VI concludes by proposing some best practices for activists and lawyers when considering these models.
I. SOCIOCRATIC NON-PROFITS
Non-profits have been experimenting with sociocracy since the
1990s, although the concept of sociocracy is not at all new. The term
“sociocracy” was first used in the mid-nineteenth century by the
French positivist philosopher Auguste Comte and then expanded on
at the turn of the twentieth century by pioneering U.S. sociologist
Lester Frank Ward; both used the term to refer to forms of self-governance among groups of people who share social bonds.42 Decades
42

JOHN A. BUCK & GERARD ENDENBURG, THE CREATIVE FORCES OF SELFORGANIZATION 3 (4th ed. 2012), http://thesociocracygroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CreativeForces_9-2012_web.pdf; A Brief History, SOCIOCRACY
3.0, https://sociocracy30.org/a-brief-history/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). Comte
described sociocracy as a perfect society not led by monarchs or the church, but
by a central government of social scientists with the participation of all in a society. See id. at 3–4. Ward was influenced by Comte’s social positivism, but, like
Thomas Hobbes and Herbert Spencer, he understood the state through an analogy,
as a living organism akin to an individual human. See LESTER FRANK WARD, THE
PSYCHIC FACTORS OF CIVILIZATION 121–24 (1892) (describing and distinguishing
his thinking from the work of Spencer and Comte). Ward argues that democratic
states rely on a majoritarian fiction, the idea that the will of the people is somehow
expressed by “the majority of qualified electors, no matter how small that majority
may be” and believed that a sociocratic government could eliminate partisanship
by having government always do “under the same circumstances just what an intelligent individual would do.” Id. at 327.
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later, Kees Boeke, a Dutch polymath influenced by Comte and
Ward, tried to implement their theories in an educational setting
when he founded a private Quaker school called Werkplaats Kindergemeenschap (the Children’s Community Workshop) in 1926.43
Although influenced by the earlier theorists of sociocracy, Boeke’s
model departs little from traditional Quaker practices of self-governance, aiming for groups within his school to collectively and
unanimously make decisions that would then bind all members of
the group to honor and act in furtherance of those decisions. 44 One
of the young students at the school was Gerard Endenburg, who,
decades later, would develop his childhood experience at Boeke’s
school into the four principles that form the core of sociocratic organizations today.45
Section I.A presents a brief history of Endenberg’s career and
how he came to develop modern sociocracy at his engineering firm,
and introduces the four principles of sociocracy that Endenburg developed as the core of sociocratic governance. With that background, Section I.B describes some of the varied ways that the sociocratic model has been modified and experimented with by different
non-profit organizations, and highlights how sociocracy has been
implemented by one member-driven activist non-profit.

43

JOHN A. BUCK & SHARON VILLINES, WE THE PEOPLE: CONSENTING TO A
DEEPER DEMOCRACY 34–36 (2007). The school was organized around Boeke’s
interpretation of sociocratic principles and Quaker practices; it would become a
hub of Dutch resistance to Nazi Germany, educating Jewish teenagers fleeing
Germany and helping to smuggle Jews out of Nazi-occupied territory. Id.
44
Kees Boeke, Sociocracy: Democracy as It Might Be, in BUCK & VILLINES,
supra note 43, at app. B at 191, 193 (2007); see BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43,
at 36–38 (describing the influence of Quaker practices on his school). In Boeke’s
framing of sociocracy, there were three core rules for decision-making: (1) the
interests of all members must be considered, with individual members deferring
to the interests of the group; (2) decisions must be ones that all members can accept, or else no action can be taken; and (3) all members must be ready to act in
furtherance of a decision when unanimously made. Id.
45
See BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 39–47.
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A.

Gerard Endenburg and the Development of the
Four Principles of Sociocracy
Endenburg was the son of Dutch pacifists who founded a successful Rotterdam-based engineering firm, Endenburg Electrotechniek B.V. (“Endenburg Electric”).46 After attending Boeke’s school,
going to college, and serving in the military, Endenburg worked as
an engineer at Philips Electronics, where he was far more focused
on technology and the applied sciences than pacifism, Quakerism,
or the theories of Comte and Ward.47 But when his parents invited
him to become the new general manager of Endenburg Electric in
the late 1960s, Endenburg began an intensive, systematic analysis
of management techniques, bringing his interests in cybernetics,
systems thinking, and game theory to understanding firm management.48 He chose to cap the company’s growth in order to turn attention away from profit-maximization and toward innovation, promoting entrepreneurialism among the workers, and experimenting
with business structures.49 He considered turning Endenburg Electric into a worker-owned cooperative, but felt that cooperatives were
inherently bound to struggle with management and capitalization, so
he instead developed an employee compensation and profit-distribution structure that involved both fixed and variable compensation
for the company’s workers, managers, and investors, a model that
aimed to weaken the power of outside investors50 while encouraging
workers to be entrepreneurial and take responsibility for the success
of the business.51

46

JACK QUARTER, BEYOND THE BOTTOM LINE: SOCIALLY INNOVATIVE BUSINESS OWNERS 54 (2000).
47
BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 38.
48

Id. at 40–41.
A. Georges L. Romme, Domination, Self-Determination and Circular Organizing, 20 ORG. STUD. 801, 810 (1999).
50
Id. at 815–16.
51
BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 41–42. After more than a decade leading Endenburg Electric, Endenburg ultimately transferred his ownership stake in
the company to a holding company to be purchased by the company’s workers
over a ten-year period, and became the director of an organization called Socioc49

880

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:863

Most influentially,52 Endenburg sought to promote more democratic group decision-making within the firm through what he called

ratisch Centrum (Sociocratic Center), which promotes the sociocratic model internationally. QUARTER, supra note 46, at 55–56. Notably, one reason for his departure was his frustration with Endenberg Electric’s unionized labor force, which
he felt harmed the entrepreneurial spirit of the company’s workers, and he sought
to make all of the workers into owners in part to change this dynamic. Id. at 55.
52
Beyond the dozens of businesses and non-profits that have adopted sociocratic principles, Endenburg’s model would be a major influence on more popular
management trends, and the four principles form the backbone of some of the
most widely discussed trends in management theory of the 2010s, including Teal
Organizations and Holacracy. Teal Organizations aim to have their business structures operate like ecosystems, based on the principles of: (1) self-management
rather than top-down hierarchy or consensus; (2) personal wholeness of workers,
inviting workers to not come to the workplace with only a narrow “professional”
self but also to remain in touch with their emotional and intuitive selves; and (3)
evolutionary purpose, recognizing that the group entity has a direction of its own
that it wants to serve. FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A
GUIDE TO CREATING ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN
CONSCIOUSNESS 55–57 (2014). Teal Organizations also developed the idea of the
“advice process,” an influential variation on Consent processes. The idea is that
for certain kinds of decisions, a person can make a decision on his or her own, but
only after seeking advice from both people who will be meaningfully affected by
the decision and from people with expertise in the matter; advice must be sought,
but it is up to the decision-maker whether or not to modify her approach based on
that advice. See Decision Making, REINVENTING ORG. WIKI, http://www.reinventingorganizationswiki.com/Decision_Making (last visited Feb. 1, 2019); Rebellious Practices: Make Better Decisions with the Advice Process, CORP. REBELS
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://corporate-rebels.com/advice-process/.
Holacracy has received significant attention from the business press and has
been implemented by Zappos.com and, for a period of time, the online publishing
platform Medium. See, e.g., Ethan Bernstein et al., Beyond the Holacracy Hype,
HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 2016, at 38, 40, https://hbr.org/2016/ 07/beyondthe-holacracy-hype; Andy Doyle, Management and Organization at Medium,
MEDIUM (Mar. 4, 2016), https://blog.medium.com/management-and-organization-at-medium-2228cc9d93e9; Adam Pisoni, Here’s Why You Should Care
About Holacracy, FIRST ROUND REV., https://firstround.com/review/heres-whyyou-should-care-about-holacracy (last visited Feb. 25, 2019); Marcus Wohlsen,
The Next Big Thing You Missed: Companies That Work Better Without Bosses,
WIRED (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/01/holacracy-at-zappos. Holacracy has proven influential with certain high-tech firms, as it aims to mirror the
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the “four principles” of sociocracy: (1) policy decisions are made by
Consent, “the absence of any ‘reasoned objections’” to a proposal
by members of a decision-making group; (2) Consent decisions are
made largely in self-managed, semi-autonomous groups called Circles; (3) while the decision-making process within a Circle aims to
be egalitarian, the Circles themselves are in a hierarchical relationship with one another, connected up and down the hierarchy through
“double links,” representatives from lower and higher Circles who
participate in the Circle; and (4) people within a Circle are selected
for specific functions and tasks by the Consent of the members of
the Circle after an open discussion.53
1. CONSENT
Influenced by his experience at Boeke’s school, but recognizing
that obtaining unanimous consensus54 in large groups can be nearly
flexibility of the trend toward Agile software development through bringing together elements of Agile development and sociocracy, including sociocracy’s hierarchy of Circles and double-linking between those Circles. Pepijn van de Kamp,
Holacracy–A Radical Approach to Organizational Design, in ELEMENTS OF THE
SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS—INFLUENCES ON PROJECT SUCCESS AND
FAILURE 13, 19–20 (2014). See generally BRIAN J. ROBERTSON, HOLACRACY:
THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD 3, 12–13
(2015); Holacracy Constitution, HOLACRACY (June 2015), http://www.holacracy.org/constitution.
Less popular than Teal Organizations and holacracy is another management
model called Sociocracy 3.0, which expands Endenburg’s four principles into a
new list of seven principles: (1) effectiveness (devoting time only to your objectives); (2) consent (asking for and resolving any objections before approving decisions); (3) empiricism (“test[ing] all assumptions through experimentation”);
(4) continuous improvement (“chang[ing] incrementally to accommodate steady
empirical learning”); (5) equivalence (allowing people affected by decisions to
influence and change them); (6) transparency (making information available to all
in the organization absent reasons for confidentiality); and (7) accountability (responding and taking ownership for the course of the organization as a whole).
BRIAN BOCKELBRING ET AL., SOCIOCRACY 3.0 – A PRACTICAL GUIDE 20–21
(2019) http://sociocracy30.org/_res/s3-all-patterns-explained.pdf.
53
QUARTER, supra note 46, at 53–54; BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at
44–46.
54
Romme, supra note 49, at 810 (stating that Endenburg believed “consen-
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impossible, Endenburg developed a process for collaborative decision-making based on what he saw as a technical or quasi-scientific
idea of “Consent.”55 For Boeke, the pacifist Quaker, once members
of a group have trust and respect for one another, decisions can be
made peacefully and with unanimity; in contrast, Endenburg’s idea
of Consent looked at decision-making in his business as machinelike—rather than grounding decision-making on mutual trust and
respect, the firm-as-machine needs only to have all parts working
well enough that the machine does not break down.56 Where the
Quaker consensus model requires all participants to affirmatively
agree in order to take group action, Endenburg’s Consent process
simply requires that no participant give a “reasoned objection” to a
proposal.57 The process is meant to foster a dialogue in which the
participants attempt to arrive at a position all can accept, rather than
forcing those who would lose a majority vote to acquiesce to a position they find intolerable.58 In Endenburg’s model, sociocratic organizations do not need to go through a Consent process for routine
decisions, but there must be Consent for decisions on larger policy
issues.59
The Consent process follows a series of formal steps. First, a
person or group will generate a proposal, typically in a written draft
prepared and circulated for comment prior to the meeting at which
it is to be discussed. At that meeting, the group goes through four
steps: (1) presentation of the proposal; (2) a clarifying round, in
which only clarifying questions are asked about the proposal; (3) a
sus” meant the Quaker principle of “full agreement to consent,” or the total “absence of any argued objection”). The division between consensus and Consent
articulated by Endenburg is no longer such a clear distinction. Many activist
groups today use the term consensus to mean something close to what Endenburg
calls Consent. See Haber, supra note 25, at 334 (describing the consensus process
used in the Occupy Wall Street movement, in which consensus was supposed to
be blocked only in the rare situation where a participant had a serious moral, ethical, or safety concern about a proposal).
55
BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 42–43.
56
See id. at 43; QUARTER, supra note 46, at 57.
57
BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 6; Romme, supra note 49, at 810.
58
QUARTER, supra note 46, at 57; Romme, supra note 49, at 811.
59
BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 6.
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quick reaction round, in which quick feedback is solicited about the
proposal, and adjustments made based on these reactions if all agree;
and (4) the Consent process, in which all members of the group are
asked if they have any reasoned objections and, if so, listing them in
writing and then seeking to resolve each one through dialogue and
amendments to the proposal, or else rejecting the proposal.60
2. CIRCLES
Endenburg also moved away from a conventional governance
and management structure to spread authority to a broader range of
workers through the use of “Circles,” decision-making bodies for
people from different job functions and levels of seniority to make
joint policy decisions in their areas of responsibility.61 Although Circles are democratic forums when making decisions on the matters
before them, in the sociocratic model, the Circles themselves are set
in a hierarchy.62

60

Id. at 9.
BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 43. The term “Circle” is an imperfect
translation of the Dutch word kring, which literally translates as “ring” or “circle,”
but which also has the connotation of the English word “arena”—a place where
meaningful events happen. Id. at 43–44. The term Circle has, in the years since
Endenburg developed his model, become quite popular among groups ranging
from discussion circles to businesses that are interested in collaborative decisionmaking, and today is commonly associated with group-process tools like World
Café, Open Space, and the Art of Hosting. See The Many Faces of Circles, CTR.
FOR DYNAMIC COMMUNITY GOVERNANCE: BLOG, http://www.dynamic-governance.org/the-many-faces-of-Circles (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). Although some
in the “circle movement” appear to be influenced by sociocracy, many writers,
including leading voices within the “circle movement” such as Christina Baldwin
and Ann Linnea, trace the concept to ancient indigenous practices, not 1970s management innovations. See CHRISTINA BALDWIN & ANN LINNEA, THE CIRCLE
WAY: A LEADER IN EVERY CHAIR 4–10 (2010) (describing the circle as an important symbol of, and archetype for, group processes since the Late Paleolithic
era or earlier).
62
QUARTER, supra note 46, at 58.
61
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Figure 1. A basic organizational chart of a sociocratic firm showing
double-links between Circles

At Endenburg Electric, the lowest-level Department Circles
ranged in size from six to twenty-five people, with each Circle
tasked with setting policy for a particular area of the business, like
manufacturing, electronics, personnel, or accounting.63 Every employee of the company belonged to at least one of these Department
Circles.64 The middle-level General Circle is made up of around
twenty-five people and formulates policy for the entire company; it
is comprised of senior management, department heads, and representatives selected by each Department Circle to represent their interests in the General Circle.65 The highest-level Circle operates
somewhat like an independent corporate Board of Directors; it is
comprised of four people, neither employees nor owners, who have
experience in fields like finance, law, and government.66 Along with
63
64
65
66

Id.
Romme, supra note 49, at 808.
QUARTER, supra note 46, at 58–59.
Id. at 59.
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representatives from the General Circle, this Board Circle oversees
the organization, plans for its future, and manages corporate
shares.67
Circle meetings typically follow the following steps: (1) an
opening round, a time to “attune” and get settled; (2) administrative
concerns, including announcements, times for upcoming meetings,
Consent approval of minutes of the prior meeting, and acceptance
or amendment of the planned agenda; (3) a discussion of all agenda
items using the Consent process; and (4) a closing round, a time to
reflect on the meeting and discuss how it could have been better or
more efficient, and to discuss potential matters for future meetings.68
3. DOUBLE-LINKING
As part of this Circle structure, Endenburg created the concept
of “double-linking,” the idea that rather than having a manager as
the sole, top-down link from organizational leadership to the workers, each Circle has two links: the Operations Leader of the Circle is
a manager or supervisor, selected by the higher Circle to lead the
next-lower Circle, but the lower Circle also selects one of its members to act as a Representative of its members, bringing their perspectives to the next-higher Circle.69 Endenburg’s Circles were
capped at twenty-five people in order to encourage meaningful participation within each Circle, and relied on these double-links for
communication between the different Circles.70
4. SELECTION BY CONSENT
Endenburg’s fourth principle flows out of the first three: each
Circle uses a Consent process to select people to lead on particular
tasks, to serve as Representatives to the next-higher Circle, and
sometimes for the selection of workers for managerial positions.71
67
68
69

Id.
BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 7.
Id. at 6; BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 44; Romme, supra note 49, at

808.

70
71

QUARTER, supra note 46, at 59.
BUCK & VILLINES, supra note 43, at 41–46; QUARTER, supra note 46, at
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Sociocratic organizations conduct these elections by Consent as follows: (1) the relevant Circle first reviews the role, describing the
position and its responsibilities; (2) it then has a nomination process,
with each member of the Circle asked to nominate a person in writing; (3) the Circle then has an explanations round, with each member of the Circle explaining the reasons for their proposals; (4) there
is a change round, in which the facilitator asks all Circle members
if they want to change their nomination based on the arguments
heard in the prior round; and, finally, (5) the Circle has a Consent
round, in which the facilitator proposes the nominee with what he
or she believes are the strongest arguments in support of him or her
and asks each person, including the proposed nominee, if he or she
has any reasoned objection to the proposed nomination.72
B. Sociocracy in Non-Profit Organizations
Today, sociocratic governance is used internationally by manufacturing and technology firms, local government agencies, and by
a variety of non-profit organizations.73 This Section will describe
how non-profits have implemented sociocracy, focusing on the following considerations: (1) how non-profits use Circles; (2) the role
of the Board of Directors and corporate officers in sociocratic nonprofits; (3) the role of non-profit members, volunteers, and other
stakeholders in sociocratic non-profits; and, finally, (4) an analysis
of one activist group that has developed a member-driven sociocratic non-profit structure.
1. THE USE OF CIRCLES IN SOCIOCRATIC NON-PROFITS
At the core of the sociocratic corporate structure is the hierarchy
of double-linked Circles.74 An analysis of a widely-used template
for non-profit sociocratic corporate by-laws shows the hierarchy of
62 (noting that in some cases mangers are selected through this process, but in
others, managers are selected by the next-higher Circle).
72
BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 7–8.
73
See Sociocracy Today, SOCIOCRACY, http://www.sociocracy.info/aboutsociocracy/sociocracy-today/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
74
BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 6.
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Circles in a non-profit sociocratic organization to function similarly
to the hierarchy of Circles in any sociocratic entity: the Board Circle
is made up of the Board of Directors and a Representative from the
General Circle; the General Circle is made up of the Executive Director or Chief Executive Officer and other organizational leaders,
an Operations Leader chosen by the Board of Directors, and Representatives to the Circle chosen by lower Department Circles; and the
Department Circles are comprised of staff within one program area,
along with an Operations Leader chosen by the General Circle.75 In
cases where there is a hierarchy among Department Circles, a lower
Department Circle has an Operations Leader chosen by the higher
Department Circle, and the lower Department Circle selects a Representative to the higher Department Circle.76
Although this model does not completely eliminate organizational hierarchy, the Circle model and Consent process may allow
staff within each Circle to have more autonomy and control over
their work than in conventional non-profit structures. While a Circle
must stay within the limits imposed on it by the next-higher Circle,
it has the freedom to select and execute its own projects and develop
policies in furtherance of the purposes set by that higher Circle.77
Sociocratic non-profits may grant Department Circles autonomy to
determine how they will staff, execute, and evaluate their own projects.78 Department Circles also may establish their own procedures
for certain administrative and managerial responsibilities, including:
setting Circle-level recordkeeping policies; providing professional
development opportunities for members; selecting Representatives
to the next-higher Circle; developing a budget and choosing how to
spend funds allocated to the Circle; creating lower Circles as it
deems appropriate; selecting the Operations Leader of the next75

See John Buck & Sharon Villines, Bylaws for a Sociocratic Organization,
SOCIOCRACY, http://www.sociocracy.info/bylaws-for-a-sociocratic-organization/
(last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Buck & Villines, Bylaws]. This form for
sociocratic non-profit by-laws was originally written for a membership non-profit
incorporated in Washington, D.C. Id.
76
Id. art. 3.
77
Id. art. 4.
78
Id.
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lower Circle; and deciding whether lower Circles should be subdivided, combined, or dissolved.79
Circles do not have complete autonomy, however. Sociocratic
non-profits balance Circle autonomy with rules designed to ensure
accountability to the overall organization and to promote efficient
work processes and decision-making. The system of double-links,
for instance, encourages the accountability of the Circle to the organization by requiring each Circle to give oversight to the nextlower Circle and to report its operations to the next-higher Circle.80
Sociocratic non-profits also impose recordkeeping rules designed to
promote accountability, requiring that Circles keep substantial notes
in a logbook that documents budgets, policy decisions, and meeting
notes, as well as the individual Circle members’ aims, roles, responsibilities, and development plans.81 Finally, sociocratic non-profits
may establish a back-up process that can be triggered if a Circle process fails to produce Consent on a critical issue.82
2. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND CORPORATE
OFFICERS IN SOCIOCRATIC NON-PROFITS
The Board of Directors of a sociocratic non-profit is, of course,
ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with all applicable
corporate, tax, regulatory, and contractual responsibilities, and sociocratic Board Circles usually approach those responsibilities similarly to the Boards of professionalized non-profits.83 The Board Circle of a sociocratic non-profit may be responsible for setting and
79

Id. The only decisions exempted from a regular Circle governance process
are decisions regarding Circle elimination or redefinition, when the Operations
Leader and Representatives of the lower Circle may participate in the discussion
but are not part of the Consent process, and personnel decisions, when a member
who is the subject of the decision may participate in the decision-making but may
not participate in granting or blocking Consent to those decisions. Id. § 4.2.
80
Id. § 4.3. In addition to the Operations Leader, Circles generally select a
facilitator to lead all Circle meetings, who may be asked to ensure that the Circle
is complying with its mission and functioning in accordance with sociocratic principles. Id. art. 4.
81
Id.
82
Id. § 5.7.
83
Id. §§ 6.1, 6.2.
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overseeing the execution of a strategic plan; ensuring fiscal responsibility and long-term viability; generating new ideas and directions;
and maintaining connections with external persons, organizations,
agencies, and any other necessary bodies.84
The Board Circle of a sociocratic non-profit typically consists of
the following positions: the Executive Director, Chief Executive Officer, or similar staff leader; Representatives from the General Circle; and three or more “expert” directors, usually selected for their
experience with sociocratic governance or their legal, operations,
fundraising, or accounting expertise.85 Like other non-profit directors, the directors of a sociocratic non-profit are treated as fiduciaries, may be indemnified for acts conducted in good faith and in pursuit of work duly approved by the organization, and are typically
uncompensated for their work as directors.86 Directors are selected
through a Consent election.87 Sociocratic non-profits do not allow
Board Circles to dissolve their organizations without the approval
of their other Circles, and sociocratic non-profit Boards Circles use
the Consent process rather than a majority or super-majority vote to
make decisions.88 Like other Circles, when a Board Circle fails to
obtain Consent, it may foresake internal democracy and refer the
matter to a single director with expertise in the relevant subject area
and agree to follow his or her judgement.89
Corporate officers in sociocratic non-profits are chosen by a
Consent election and usually mirror conventional non-profit corporate officers. Officers may include a President responsible for overseeing staff, monitoring compliance with internal and external rules,
and speaking for the organization, a Treasurer responsible for oversight of the organization’s finances, and a Secretary responsible for

84

Id. § 6.2.
Id. §§ 6.3, 6.5.
86
Id. §§ 6.6, 6.7, art. 13.
87
Id. art. 7. For a description of the Consent election process, see supra note
72 and accompanying text.
88
Buck & Villines, Bylaws, supra note 75, § 5.6.
89
Id.
85
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taking minutes at meetings and keeping accurate corporate records.90
3. ROLES FOR VOLUNTEERS, MEMBERS, AND OTHER
STAKEHOLDERS IN SOCIOCRATIC NON-PROFITS
Sociocratic non-profits generally aim to be more inclusive of
volunteers in their governance processes than professionalized nonprofits do.91 Volunteers may be brought into corporate governance
through a Volunteer Circle double-linked to the Board Circle or
General Circle, or they may be distributed by function or department
across a variety of Department Circles.92

Advisory
Board Circle

Board Circle

Members
Circle

Funders
Funders

Circle

Circle

General Circle

Group 3
Group 1

Group 2

Figure 2. A sociocratic non-profit with members, advisory board, and
funders Circles93
90

Id. § 6.4.
JOHN A. BUCK & JERRY KOCH-GONZALEZ, DYNAMIC GOVERNANCE FOR
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2014), http://sociocracyconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/DG-for-Nonprofits-v1-11-14.pdf.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 4.
91
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Sociocratic non-profits may take other stakeholders into their
governance structures as well: people who receive direct organizational services, like students in a school or homeless families in a
shelter; those who indirectly receive the benefits of those direct services, like the parents of students in a school; and sometimes even
donors or grantors who contribute funds to an organization may be
included in its governance structure.94 A sociocratic non-profit may
put all of these stakeholders into one “Client’s Circle,” or may put
them in different Circles based on their roles and connections to the
organization.95
The sociocratic model can be used quite differently in different
contexts. Some sociocratic non-profits, consistent with the professionalized non-profit model, have no members, or have members
with very limited rights, and use Endenburg’s model to democratize
governance and decision-making only among Board and staff.96 But
other sociocratic non-profits use sociocracy as a mechanism for
structuring and sharing decision-making powers with members.
Some groups offer members a limited voice in organizational matters by double-linking a Circle of members and other stakeholders
to the Board, giving members a voice at the Board level and allowing the Board to convey information to members, but not allowing
members much functional control over the Board or staff.97
Other groups use the four principles of sociocracy to more fully
integrate members into organizational governance and decisionmaking. Sociocracy has been particularly popular with non-profit
intentional communities98 like ecovillages, student cooperatives, cohousing groups, monasteries, ashrams, and communes, groups of
94

Id. at 3.
Id.
96
See, e.g., Buck & Villines, Bylaws, supra note 75, art. 9 (establishing that
members fo the organization do not have voting rights); see also BUCK & ENDENBURG, supra note 42, at 5.
97
See BUCK & KOCH-GONZALEZ, supra note 91, at 4–6.
98
See Diana Leafe Christian, Transparency, Equivalence, and Effectiveness:
How Sociocracy Can Help Communities, Part I, 160 COMMUNITIES 59, 63 (2013)
(listing eleven intentional communities using sociocracy across North America
95

892

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:863

people who have chosen “to live together with a common purpose,
working cooperatively to create a lifestyle that reflects their shared
values.”99 Many of these groups are philosophically inclined toward
democratic, non-hierarchical decision-making and had previously
relied on inefficient unanimous consensus rules, so the Consent process spread quickly among these groups between the 1990s and
2010s, even as these groups sometimes sought to modify other elements of the sociocratic structure to grant more rights to members,
make sociocratic processes more efficient for groups of different
sizes, or make members’ experiences of sociocratic processes feel
less hiearchical.100
4. THE MULTIPURPOSE, MEMBER-DRIVEN
SOCIOCRATIC ACTIVIST NON-PROFIT
Influenced by these non-profit sociocratic models, the North
Bay (California) Chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America
and Europe).
99
Intentional Communities, FELLOWSHIP FOR INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY
http://www.ic.org/wiki/intentional-communities/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).
100
See, e.g., Anamaria Aristizabal, Sociocracy to the Rescue at Aldeafeliz
Ecovillage: How Sociocracy Can Help Communities, Part V, 166 COMMUNITIES
55 (2015) (describing how an ecovillage “made the methodology our own, not
always following the Sociocratic method to the letter”); Diana Leafe Christian,
Consensus and the Burden of Added Process: Are There Easier Ways to Make
Decisions?, Part I, 158 COMMUNITIES 56, 58 (2013) (describing frustrations with
the Consent process and rising interest in newer methods, including “Sociocracy,
Holacracy, and the N Street Consensus Method”); Diana Leafe Christian, SelfGovernance with Circles and Double Links: How Sociocracy Can Help Communities, Part II, 161 COMMUNITIES 61–64 (2013) [hereinafter Christian, Self-Governance with Circles and Double Links] (describing changes from the original
Endenburg model, including changing the concept of Circles that are higher or
lower in hierarchy to Circles that are “larger,” more abstract or long-term and
“smaller,” more concrete or focused on short-term goals); Tena Meadows O’Rear
& John Buck, Going Dutch: Sociocracy at EcoVillage of Loudoun County, 109
COMMUNITIES 38, 39 (2000) (describing how the frustration and inefficiency of
consensus governance of an ecovillage was greatly improved after changing to
sociocracy). Despite the relatively widespread interest in sociocracy within intentional communities, most such groups still groups use other decision-making processes. Christian, Self-Governance with Circles and Double Links, supra, at 61.
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(“North Bay DSA”) selected a sociocratic non-profit model to structure its membership non-profit that focuses on politicized community- and member-organizing.101 This model looks to a degree like
other sociocratic non-profits, but by transforming the sociocratic
structure from a system for empowering employees within an organization’s governance to a model for organizing a membership-led,
activist group, the sociocratic structure becomes significantly more
aligned with the anti-authoritarian principles of autonomy, horizontalism, and prefigurative politics,102 which North Bay DSA expressly aims to do.103
Like other sociocratic non-profits, the North Bay DSA generally
follows the four sociocratic principles, and its decision-making is
101

See Bylaws for the Democratic Socialists of America, North Bay Chapter,
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS AM., at art. IV (Oct. 2017), https://www.dsa
northbay.org/s/DSA-North-Bay-Bylaws.pdf [hereinafter North Bay Bylaws]. The
Democratic Socialists of America (“DSA”) is a national organization of socialists
that, following the 2016 presidential campaign of Senator Bernie Sanders, grew
to become the largest socialist organization since the 1950s, claiming more than
50,000 members by 2018. See Alexi McCammond, By the Numbers: Democratic
Socialist Victories in the 2018 Midterms, AXIOS (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.axios.com/democratic-socialist-candidates-who-have-won-in-2018-midterms-6bf
604a3-ee98-4ab3-9e63-349aec324c43.html (discussing 50,000 members as of
2018); Joseph M. Schwartz, A History of Democratic Socialists of America 19712017, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS AM. (July 2017), https://www.dsausa.org/aboutus/history/. The national DSA has fairly few staff and a delegate-elected Board.
Leadership and Structure, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS AM., https://www.ds
ausa.org/about-us/structure/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). As of early 2019, the
DSA had 189 state and local chapters. See Chapters, DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS
AM., https://www.dsausa.org/chapters/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2019). The structure
of the North Bay DSA is considerably different from the structure described in
the model bylaws for local chapters that were promulgated by the Steering Committee of the DSA’s National Political Committee, which look much more like
conventional professionalized non-profit bylaws with most organizational power
concentrated in a centralized Board of Directors elected by membership. This
model was criticized by many DSA members for both procedural and substantive
reasons. DSA Accountability, Proposal for Sample Chapter Bylaws, MEDIUM
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://medium.com/@dsa.acctability/proposal-for-samplechapter-bylaws-83124652978e.
102
See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
103
See North Bay Bylaws, supra note 101, art. II.
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done by Consent.104 North Bay DSA’s lowest-level Departmental
Circles include all people who have a “significant role” in particular
projects, and the group allows each Circle to self-define who meets
that standard.105 Disputes over such decisions are referred to a member-selected Conflict Resolution Circle, which serves as a neutral
arbiter in the event of internal conflicts.106

Figure 3. A sociocratic non-profit with a General Assembly of all members
as its Top Circle107

North Bay DSA’s middle-level Circle is its Coordination Circle,
which manages the operations of the group within the limits set by
the Top Circle, but its Top Circle, rather than consisting of a conventional Board of Directors, is a General Assembly made up of all

104

Id. art. IV, § 3; art. VII, § 2. Circles may choose, by Consent, to use another
method of decision-making. Id. art. VII, § 2.
105
Id. art. V, § 4(a).
106
Id. art. V, § 10.
107
With all members in the Top Circle, that Circle graphically comes to envelop the other Circles, as substantially all of the Coordination Circle and Departmental Circles are comprised of members of the General Assembly. See id. art.
V.
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members of the chapter in good standing.108 By elevating its membership to this Top Circle, the North Bay DSA is making clear that
its membership holds the ultimate power in the organization, and
that the Coordination Circle, which manages certain operational
tasks that might typically be reserved for a non-profit Board, answers to the membership.109 Officer duties, similarly, are largely
within the control of the General Assembly, which elects a treasurer
to manage organizational finances, as well as between one to three
secretaries to do much of the coordination of meetings of the General Assembly.110
These Circles are all double-linked together, with autonomy for
each Circle to choose how it will pursue the goals set for it by the
next-higher Circle.111 The Circles self-select their Circle-level officers, which include: a Leader, who is tasked with ensuring that the
work of the Circle is done in a timely way; a Facilitator, who facilitates Circle meetings; a Secretary, who coordinates minutes and
meeting announcements; a Logbook Keeper, who maintains a logbook detailing the activities of the Circle; and a Representative, who
participates in the next-higher Circle.112
North Bay DSA explains that it developed this adaptation of the
sociocratic non-profit model in order to build a socialist organization that aligns closely with the three anti-authoritarian principles:
autonomy and self-governance, which it argues its sociocratic model
promotes among members;113 horizontalism and the commitment to
108

Id. art. V, §§ 5, 9. The concept of the General Assembly is associated with
anti-authoritarian activism and implies that all can participate, speak, and make
proposals as full participants in a meeting. Haber, supra note 25, at 334. General
Assemblies often do not function as a decision-making body that takes large group
votes, but rather as a forum that hears the perspectives of members of the group
and then allows “individuals and subgroups . . . [to] act autonomously, respecting
the assembly while sparing it the burden of micromanagement.” NATHAN SCHNEIDER, THANK YOU, ANARCHY: NOTES FROM THE OCCUPY APOCALYPSE 19 (2013).
109
See North Bay Bylaws, supra note 101, art. V, § 9.
110
Id. art. VIII, § 3.
111
Id. art. IV, § 3; art. VI, § 1.
112
Id. art. VI, § 3.
113
Id. art. IV, § 2(b) (listing among the purposes of its sociocratic governance
model “self-governance, self-organization, and cooperation”).
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equality, intersectionality, and opposition to the marginalization of
all who have been marginalized in society, which it presents as at
the very core of both its vision of socialism and its organizational
structure;114 and prefigurativism, contending that their version of sociocracy is itself already helping to build the world they want to see,
“prefigure[ing] a more radically egalitarian socialist future.”115
II. WORKER SELF-DIRECTED NON-PROFITS
The concept of the worker self-directed non-profit was developed by the Oakland-based non-profit law firm Sustainable Economies Law Center (“SELC”),116 echoing economist Richard Wolff’s
term “Worker Self-Directed Enterprises” (“WSDEs”), meaning
businesses in which workers are the lead decision-makers for their
enterprises.117 The idea of the WSDE might sometimes be confused
with that of the worker-owned cooperative, but the two are distinct.
The worker-owned cooperative is defined by worker ownership of
the firm, from which a more egalitarian management of the firm
flows: “the ownership of capital by labor and labor’s resulting management of capital.”118 Conversely, the idea of the WSDE is fundamentally about governance of the firm:
[It is] not primarily a matter of workers as owners of
these enterprises (fine, but not required), nor primarily as managers (likewise fine, but not required). It is
114

Id. art. II, § 1 (asserting that “our socialism must be intersectional in nature. . . . We are committed to fighting transphobia, racism, homophobia, ableism,
and imperialism, both in the world and in our own ranks”).
115
Id. art. IV, § 2.
116
See Sustainable Economies Law Center, Webinar on Worker Self Directed
Nonprofits: Workplace Democracy in Nonprofit Organizations, YOUTUBE (June
2, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uU1w9uXGGLY [hereinafter
SELC, Webinar on Worker Self Directed Nonprofits] (discussing the SELC’s
adoption of its worker self-directed nonprofit model at 17:54–18:01).
117
See RICHARD WOLFF, DEMOCRACY AT WORK: A CURE FOR CAPITALISM
117 (2012).
118
FRANK T. ADAMS & GARY B. HANSEN, PUTTING DEMOCRACY TO WORK:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR STARTING AND MANAGING WORKER-OWNED BUSINESSES 1 (2d. ed. 1992).
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the tasks of direction—the decision making now assigned usually and primarily to corporate boards of
directors and only secondarily to the major shareholders who choose them—that must be transferred
to the workers collectively.119
With this distinction in mind, the sometimes-discussed idea of a
“non-profit worker co-op” is muddled, as Boards of Directors of
most tax-exempt non-profits are barred from distributing non-profit
corporate revenues to their directors, staff, or others, outside of reasonable compensation for work performed.120 On the other hand, the
concept of a non-profit WSDE could describe any non-profit in
which staff set the general direction for the organization with little
guidance from the Board. While the name may imply a broader concept, the model of the worker self-directed non-profit developed by
SELC is unique, inspired by the principles of the commons movement121 and parts of the sociocratic governance model.122 Although
119

RICHARD D. WOLFF, NEXT SYS. PROJECT, START WITH WORKER SELF-DIENTERPRISES (2016), https://thenextsystem.org/sites/default/files/201708/RickWolff.pdf.
120
Prohibitions on private inurement are found in section 501 of the Internal
Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), (4), (6), (7), (9), (11), (13), (19) (2012). A
similar prohibition is applied to section 501(c)(5) organizations by regulation.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(5)-1.
121
See Janelle Orsi, Three Legal Principles for Organizations Rebuilding the
Commons, in LAW AND POLICY FOR A NEW ECONOMY: SUSTAINABLE, JUST, AND
DEMOCRATIC 119, 120–23 (Melissa K. Scanlan ed. 2017) (describing the principles for developing the organizational structure of SELC as grounded in the commons movement). Orsi argues that the worker self-directed non-profit model aims
for three goals: caring instead of competing, sharing instead of bidding and buying, and sufficiency instead of acquisition and accumulation. Id. at 121 (citing
KABIR SANJAY BAVIKATTE, STEWARDING THE EARTH: RETHINKING PROPERTY
AND THE EMERGENCY OF BIOCULTURAL RIGHTS (2014)).
122
SELC describes itself as having a “SELCocratic” governance structure,
one “adapted in part from Holacracy, Sociocracy, and other governance models.”
SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., INTRODUCTION TO SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES
LAW CENTER’S GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE & ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 1
(2016), https://docs.google.com/document/d/1jsN-Ti43vv286gt0CUfEYrYTl_ay
QLfBR3j34LqgD1Y/edit# [hereinafter SELC INTRODUCTION].
RECTED
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there appear to be few organizations that identify themselves specifically as worker self-directed non-profits, SELC has encouraged
other organizations to consider adopting its model, offering trainings to non-profits on the model, creating a community of practice
for organizations experimenting with the worker self-directed nonprofit model, and sharing significant portions of its own governance
documents with the public online.123 Section II.A describes the
structure and decision-making process of worker self-directed nonprofits, as articulated and implemented by SELC. Section II.B then
describes the roles of the Board of Directors, corporate officers, and
volunteers in the worker self-directed non-profit model.
A. Core Features of Worker Self-Directed Non-Profits
SELC’s worker self-directed non-profit model is built around
three organizational features: (1) semi-autonomous Circles; (2)
“moveable roles,” a framework for workers to serve the organization
in multiple ways; and (3) a Consent process modeled after that of
holacracy, a business management tool that was itself deeply influenced by sociocracy.124
1. SEMI-AUTONOMOUS CIRCLES
SELC is structured using a Circle model somewhat like a sociocratic non-profit.125 Each Circle has a purpose defined by the General Governance and Strategy Circle (the “General Circle”), but retains a “fair degree of autonomy to carry out activities that fall
within their scope.”126 Once created by the General Circle, a Circle
123

Worker Self-Directed Nonprofits, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR.,
http://www.theselc.org/worker_selfdirected_nonprofits (last visited Mar. 21,
2019). SELC has created a publicly accessible shared drive where many of its
documents may be downloaded. Sustainable Econ. Law Ctr., [Public] Worker Self
Directed Nonprofits, GOOGLE DRIVE, https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B_btttGhy3TWfmFaM1dpRi1RNGpTVDJSODAzZk52RXhpQUtuUG9ZWi1RMnN
VWWNLclZ4MTQ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
124
SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1–2; see also supra note 52 and
accompanying text (describing the influence of sociocracy on holacracy).
125
SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1.
126
Id.
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may define its own internal projects, create sub-Circles, add new
members to the Circle, and make other decisions about how to best
accomplish the mission it was given by the General Circle.127 While
the General Circle meets several times each month, the organization
tries “to devolve decision-making to the ‘localest’ scale possible,
meaning more decision[s] are made within smaller circles, rather
than the General Circle.”128 Circles are required to notify the General Circle of certain important changes, including the creation of
new projects, changes in priorities or strategies, or the creation of
new roles for staff, but they are not required to get permission from
the General Circle as long as they act in furtherance of their missions.129 This Circle-level semi-autonomy and the goal of giving
groups of workers control over their own labor may not be substantially different from the sociocratic non-profit model, but the worker
self-directed non-profit model makes a number of important
changes from the sociocratic framework.130
Unlike most sociocratic non-profits, where the General Circle
has only representatives from staff-level Departmental Circles, the
General Circle at SELC is made up of all staff, who collectively
manage the smaller Circles. 131 In other words, staff are not near the
bottom of the Circle hierarchy with managers above them and the
Board at the top, but instead management—and even governance—
decisions are made by all organizational staff collectively, with only
limited Board oversight.132 While all SELC “core staff” are part of
the General Circle, SELC acknowledges that in a larger worker selfdirected non-profit, the General Circle would have to be made up of
127

SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES LAW CENTER
ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES 2–3 (2016), https://drive.google.com/open?id=
16VifeegSk6CEjBQLHEciydDKpHSWGJl3kXrd2MxynR4 [hereinafter SELC
ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES].
128
SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1.
129
SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 3.
130
SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1.
131
Id.
132
Id. For a discussion of how SELC’s Board delegates some of its governance obligations to the General Circle, see infra notes 169–76 and accompanying
text.

900

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:863

representatives selected by the smaller Circles, perhaps more like a
sociocratic non-profit.133 At SELC, smaller Circles are tasked with
both back-office job functions (like operations or communications)
and with public-facing programming (providing legal services in
their various program areas), but the performance of each Circle is
reported back to the General Circle and, through the General Circle,
the staff collectively review the work of smaller Circles and set new
directions and policies for each Circle’s work.134

Figure 4. A worker self-directed non-profit135

133

SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
WORKER SELF DIRECTED NONPROFITS 5, https://drive.google.com/open?id
=1hVrM1BmZnzjvjWScvs4kxLd0isXnip1b (last visted Apr. 28, 2019) [hereinafter SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS] (noting that “instead of delegating all of the
power to a single Executive Director who then exercises the power through hierarchical structured departments, the Board delegates it to the staff as a collective”). “Core staff” are all staff who are expected to work more than twenty hours
per week for more than six months. SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note
127, at 2, 15.
134
SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 2–3.
135
For a more detailed model of SELC’s worker self-directed non-profit strucOF
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Worker self-directed non-profit Circles are structured differently from those of sociocratic non-profits in other ways as well.
SELC’s Circles are generally made up of only employees—not independent contractors, volunteers, or members, as they might be in
some sociocratic non-profits.136 In addition, most staff participate in
multiple Circles, unlike in most sociocratic non-profits, where staff
units are largely traditional ones, and most workers who are not
managers participate in only one or a very few Circles.137 In the
worker self-directed non-profit structure, a Board of Directors and
Advisory Board overlap with the General Circle, but a majority of
the Board of Directors are not employees and there is a more complicated division of management and governance duties between the
Board Circle and the General Circle than in the more hierarchical
sociocratic model.138
2. MOVEABLE ROLES
One significant difference between professionalized non-profits
and the mostly volunteer, member-driven civic organizations they
largely supplanted is that professionalized non-profits rely, like
most businesses, on specialized, skilled workers: a non-profit’s
ture, see SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES LAW CENTER: THE BIG PICTURE (2016), https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B6eGM
Dg0J27kZmttb2ZSdmg1V0k.
136
See id. (identifying membership of all Circles).
137
See id.
138
See infra notes 169–76 and accompanying text. The majority of the Board
at SELC is made of non-employees because of a provision in the California Corporations Code that requires no more than forty-nine percent (49%) of the Board
of any California corporation to be made up of interested persons, including employees, independent contractors, and their families. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227
(West 2019); see SELC, Webinar on Worker Self Directed Nonprofits, supra note
116 (discussing California’s requirement to include disinterested parties on the
Board at 49:13–49:22). For a discussion of directors’ duty of care in these organizations and an analysis of the rules regarding employees of a non-profit serving
on its Board, see infra Section V.A. There is little discussion of the advisory board
in the SELC literature; this may be because it plays a role similar to other nonprofit advisory boards.
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grantwriter specializes in grantwriting, its web team has expertise in
web design, its program staff have experience in their programmatic
areas, and all grow their skills in their areas of expertise as they continue to work in those roles.139 SELC argues that such specialization
tends to promote “hierarchy, bureaucracy, and pay differentials.”140
At SELC, workers are asked to fill a variety, perhaps even dozens,
of different roles.141 This improves organizational flexibility and resiliency, and promotes greater equality and fairness among workers.142 For example, when a need for additional staffing arises,
SELC workers are often able to quickly fill the need because some
of them are already experienced in the role.143 This approach also
encourages staff to play an active role in their own professional development, letting them learn the new skills they wish to pursue.144
It decreases assumptions about status and worth that come from
fixed job titles, and allows for workers to improve organizational
workflow and understand the organization’s operations, “from the
administrative to the visionary.”145
Despite that goal, SELC’s moveable roles cannot completely
mean that staff have no specialization or focus. It seems that many
staff have core responsibilities that attach to them as individuals:
non-lawyers cannot simply take over the work that requires a licensed attorney, and, even beyond that, the Housing & Cooperatives
Attorney who leads the Housing program area and the Food & Farm
Attorney who leads the Food and Farm program area likely cannot
swap jobs without a substantial loss of subject-matter expertise.146

139

See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1. All SELC employees must also
be categorized as exempt employees for purposes of state and federal overtime
requirements.
141
See id. at 1–2.
142
See SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS, supra note 133, at 13.
143
See id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
See SELC Staff, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR., https://www.theselc.org
/staff (last visited Apr. 28, 2019) (describing staff titles and responsibilities).
140
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Still, many administrative roles and secondary or tertiary responsibilities can rotate, allowing workers to pursue their individual interests, and allowing them to avoid feeling trapped in undesirable
roles—or roles they cannot perform well—for too long.147
SELC has twenty-four Circles and, within each Circle, there
may be anywhere between two and fifteen specific roles.148 A SELC
employee may be responsible for many roles in a Circle, so a particular Circle may be made up of only four people, but have fifteen
different roles.149 Some roles are assigned by Consent to a proposal
from a Circle member, while others are filled through an election
process.150 Any individual employee in a worker self-directed nonprofit will have an overall workload that is made up of many different roles.151 SELC’s staffing model also includes many other innovations designed to promote employee satisfaction and work-life
balance, including a thirty-hour work week, flexible scheduling, robust “upskilling” and professional development opportunities, and
equal pay for all workers—from the most junior to the Executive
Director.152

147
SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS, supra note 133, at 13 (describing the
flexibility allowed workers through the moveable roles); SELC INTRODUCTION,
supra note 122, at 2 (noting that if a worker is not a good fit for a certain role, he
or she could be moved to another role without the need to terminate his or her
employment).
148
Assigning Responsibilities in a Worker Self-Directed Nonprofit, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR., http://www.theselc.org/assigning_responsibilities (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
149
For example, SELC’s Worker Cooperative Circle has four people in it,
with more than fifteen different roles, including a legal research steward, who
tracks all outstanding research projects, an intern steward, who operates a summer
internship program focused on cooperatives, and a Co-opLaw.org Web Master
who manages the technical aspects of one of SELC’s websites. Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Cat Johnson, 7 Ways to Create a More Democratic Nonprofit, SHAREABLE
(July 14, 2015), https://www.shareable.net/blog/7-ways-to-create-a-more-democratic-nonprofit.
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3. CONSENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
SELC uses a decision-making process based largely on holacracy’s meeting process, framing Consent slightly differently than
in sociocratic organizations: instead of asking whether any Circle
members have a “reasoned objection,” SELC has Circle members
ask themselves a more plain-language version of that question: “can
I live with this?”153 SELC’s meeting process aims to be democratic
and flexible: any employee is permitted to bring topics up for discussion in their Circle; meetings have no pre-set agenda, permitting
an openness to different possibilities; and feedback is given by all
members of the Circle.154
The specific procedures used in SELC’s Consent process are
somewhat different from those of sociocratic non-profits. The General Circle has two kinds of meetings: governance meetings are held
twice monthly for making decisions on issues that affect the organization’s mission, policies that impact all staff, or the work or existence of any Circles;155 tactical meetings are held monthly for monitoring ongoing tasks that require regular oversight or action, having
Circles provide updates to the General Circle on ongoing work, and
discussing matters that involve coordination between multiple Circles.156
Governance meetings begin with the appointment of a facilitator
and note-taker, followed by a personal check-in, with each member
of the Circle sharing a high and low from his or her past week157 in
an effort to create a culture of connectedness among Circle members.158 The rest of the meeting is structured around proposals, re-

153

SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 2 (distinguishing this question
from “is this perfect and do I agree completely?”).
154
Id.
155
SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 3.
156
Id. at 5.
157
Id. at 3.
158
See Meeting Processes and Decision Making, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L.
CTR., http://www.theselc.org/meeting_processes (last visited July 27, 2018).
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quests to take some action, subject to a sociocracy-like Consent process, and triage items, requests for feedback, coordination, information, and discussion.159
Tactical meetings also begin with the appointment of a facilitator and note-taker and a personal check-in.160 The facilitator then
goes through a list of checklist items, items that need regular action
or oversight from most or all staff, with staff asked to respond with
a “thumbs up” or “thumbs down” to indicate whether they have
acted on each item.161 The facilitator goes through a list of currently
active projects to get updates from the group and discuss whether
projects have the appropriate resources.162 Circle members may then
propose new topics for discussion; when such an item is proposed,
the Circle follows a modified-sociocratic process in which all Circle
members ask one clarifying question or offer one reaction on the
topic before returning to the proposer, who may offer a response.163
After all such agenda items have been discussed or the time allocated for the meeting runs out, the facilitator leads the group in a
closing activity and closes the meeting.164
B. The Role of the Board, Corporate Officers, Volunteers, and
Members in a Worker Self-Directed Non-Profit
Some sociocratic non-profits permit members, volunteers, and
other stakeholders into their decision-making Circles, but retain ultimate governance power in a relatively small Board Circle;165 the
North Bay DSA model, on the other hand, elevates members to the
highest Circle, but it has no organizational staff.166 SELC’s worker
self-directed non-profit model takes a third approach, carefully

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166

Id.
SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
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granting greater organizational control to staff, retaining some important work for its Board and volunteers, but offering few structured roles for volunteers or members.167
1. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AND “STAFF TRUSTEES”
In many professionalized non-profits, the Board of Directors
limits its work to legally mandated governance matters, and delegates routine management of organizational activities to staff leadership.168 In the worker self-directed non-profit, the Board goes beyond that to carefully delegate governance powers to a collective of
self-governing workers, and then provides oversight to ensure that
the self-governance system is functioning to advance the best interests of the nonprofit.169 Procedurally, this may be done through either organizational bylaws or a Board resolution stating that the
Board believes that it is in the best interest of the organization to
have staff govern themselves.170 In either case, any delegation of
governance powers is limited: the Board retains statutory authority
to rescind or modify such a resolution or bylaw provision, and the
Board has ongoing fiduciary obligations to monitor the organization.171 SELC argues that this limited delegation of governance powers moves the Board from the hierarchical top of the organization to
“the periphery of the organization. . . . [The directors] do not concern
themselves with programmatic or strategic activities, they function
only to create accountability and support.”172
167

See SELC INTRODUCTION, supra note 122, at 1–2 (stating that, at SELC,
“every staff person is a center of power,” that “employees [are] primary sensors
of the organization’s needs,” and that the Circle process involves “receiving reactions and for feedback from ALL coworkers” but not delineating a specific governance role for members or other stakeholders in its Circles).
168
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
169
See SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS, supra note 133, at 5 (noting that
“instead of delegating all of the power to a single Executive Director who then
exercises the power through hierarchical structured departments, the Board delegates it to the staff as a collective”).
170
Id. at 9–10.
171
See SELC, Webinar on Worker Self Directed Nonprofits, supra note 116.
172
SELC LEGAL GUIDE FOR BOARDS, supra note 133, at 13.
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SELC staff use a variety of processes to keep its Board informed
about their work: staff report their activities to the Board at quarterly
Board meetings; they give the Board access to an online document
listing monthly accomplishments; staff give most or all Directors
access to SELC’s internal information and task-management platform to monitor activities and current proposals; and the Board is
given quarterly updates on the organization’s budget and finances,
plus ongoing access to organizational budgetary information.173
This model aims to permit meaningful self-governance by SELC
staff while providing SELC’s Board with a robust ability to monitor
the staff’s work. The Board, in turn, is asked to do significant monitoring of the organization: they closely monitor SELC’s activities,
regularly review financial information and budgets, ensure the organization’s compliance with applicable laws, review internal policies and ensure that the staff are properly using the Circle process,
review and approve compensation, and intervene when the Board
believes that the staff have made, or are considering making, a decision that is “overly risky, illegal, threatening to the Law Center’s tax
exempt status, or contrary to the mission of the Law Center.”174
SELC describes this model as a “Staff Trusteeship,” likening its
staff to trustees, who “manage the organization in fulfillment of its
mission and in trust for the benefit of society and the planet,” and its
Board to a guardian, “overseeing the activities of the organization
and ensuring that staff-initiated projects and policies are effectively
advancing the mission and remaining accountable to the community.”175 Despite this unique and perhaps imprecise nomenclature,
the shifting of some elements of governance from Board to senior
staff may not be an entirely radical departure from the trend toward
professionalized non-profits, where it is common for Boards to play
a limited role in the day-to-day practices of the organization beyond
providing a measure of general fiduciary oversight.176
173

SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 8.
SUSTAINABLE ECON. LAW CTR., BOARD HANDBOOK AND ORIENTATION
GUIDE 6 (2016), https://drive.google.com/open?id=1512BQ-BP0_nouWsl3LV
WcO9rPUdcPk9q.
175
Id. at 5.
176
See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Indeed, SELC’s Board seems to
174
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2. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
The worker self-directed non-profit also has specific oversight
roles that the Board assigns to individual directors, who SELC calls
“owls” and who play roles somewhat like those of traditional corporate officers.177 SELC’s four owls are a Financial Owl, a Worker
Governance Owl, a Legal Compliance Owl, and a Mission Owl.178
The Financial Owl, sometimes simply referred to as the Treasurer,
monitors and communicates quarterly with the SELC Circle responsible for managing SELC’s budget and expenditures.179 The Worker
Governance Owl reviews proposals and policies adopted by the
staff, reviews all staff self-assessment forms, and is responsible for
ensuring that the worker self-governance model is still in the best
interest of the organization.180 The Legal Compliance Owl, sometimes referred to as the Secretary, ensures that the organization is
operating in compliance with all relevant laws, including reviewing
a legal compliance checklist with the organization’s staff.181 The Legal Compliance Owl also is responsible for reviewing concerns that
have been raised by SELC staff through SELC’s whistleblower and
grievance protocols.182 Finally, the Mission Owl is responsible for
reviewing the monthly list of organizational accomplishments to ensure that SELC’s operations continue to be in conformity with the
organization’s mission.183 All of the owls aim to resolve any questions or concerns that arise in the course of their oversight with the
have far more information regarding the day-to-day budget and quarterly staff
accomplishments than many non-profit Boards, which often do not understand
their organizations or their obligations as fiduciaries, and are commonly not
meaningfully engaged in their Board service. See DAVID F. LARCKER ET AL.,
STAN. GRADUATE SCH. OF BUS., 2015 SURVEY ON BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1–2 (2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/
publication-pdf/cgri-survey-nonprofit-board-directors-2015.pdf.
177
SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 8.
178
The Role of the Board, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR., http://www.the
selc.org/role_of_the_board (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
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relevant staff Circles, but if any questions or concerns remain after
those conversations, the owls bring those matters to the Board.184
SELC also retains a traditional President, who serves the staff representative on the Board.185
3. LIMITED ROLES FOR VOLUNTEERS AND MEMBERS
Aside from volunteers serving on the Board or Advisory Board,
the worker self-directed non-profit model as implemented by SELC
does not offer much opportunity for governance or decision-making
authority for volunteers or members, although SELC does have policies for volunteer management.186 SELC acknowledges the importance of external stakeholders in the organization, but outside of
service on SELC’s Board or Advisory Board, does not appear to
have a structural role for their input in governance or organizational
decision-making. 187 As part of their role as staff trustees, staff are
asked to “listen to the needs and ideas of [SELC’s] stakeholders. . . . [and they have] heightened duties to respond to those needs
and ideas, and, as such, heightened influence within the organization.”188 That may be an improvement on the professionalized nonprofit model, which has been criticized for failing to respond to community members and other outside stakeholders,189 but, ultimately,
the focus on staff self-governance in the worker self-directed nonprofit model creates a smaller role for non-staff stakeholders than
the more hierarchical sociocratic non-profit model, in which members, volunteers, and other stakeholders may play a more meaningful role in organizational governance.

184

Id.
See Board of Directors, SUSTAINABLE ECON. L. CTR.,
https://www.theselc.org/board (last visited Apr. 11, 2019).
186
See SELC ORGANIZATIONAL POLICIES, supra note 127, at 18–19 (describing rules for volunteer management).
187
Orsi, supra note 121, at 132.
188
Id.
189
See supra notes 24–32 and accompanying text.
185
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III. HUB-AND-SPOKE NON-PROFIT COUNTER-INSTITUTIONS
Where sociocratic non-profits trace their roots to an iconoclastic
management innovator, and where worker self-directed non-profits
were inspired by the solidarity economy and commons movements,
the concept of the counter-institution came most directly out of radical activist practices.190 New Left activists created the term “counter-institution” to describe projects rooted in activism but aspiring
to a degree of permanence—not a short-term street protest or occupation, but a longer-term, typically community-based project aiming
to fundamentally challenge the institutions, including the non-profit
institutions, of the status quo.191 Because the concept is closely
linked with anti-authoritarian activism, the structures of counter-institutions are closely connected to autonomism, horizontalism, and
prefigurativism: “counter-institutions . . . are directly democratic,
are created and run by the people who benefit from them, and are
independent of control by the State and capital alike.”192 Part III focuses on one type of structure that has emerged for activists seeking
190

For a history of anti-authoritarian activism stretching from the fracturing
of the New Left coalition and the rise of women-of-color feminism, through the
anti-nuclear movement of the 1970s, the AIDS and radical LGBTQ and environmental movements of the 1980s, the anti-globalization movement of the 1990s
and 2000s, and the Occupy Movement and Movement for Black Lives of the
2010s, see Haber, supra note 25, at 324–35.
191
Id. at 345–46. Wini Breines, in her study of the New Left, provides the
following definition of counter-institutions:
institutions outside the established order organized along radical
egalitarian principles as a means of building the new society
within the shell of the old . . . [that] were one of the most important new left efforts. . . . An emphasis on the political
“means” in contrast to the political “end” was at their heart.
WINI BREINES, COMMUNITY AND ORGANIZATION IN THE NEW LEFT, 1962–1968:
THE GREAT REFUSAL 52 (1982). Activist and scholar Carl Boggs called counterinstitutions the “embodiment, within the ongoing political practice of the movement, of those forms of social relations, decision-making, culture, and human experience that are the ultimate goal.” Carl Boggs, Marxism, Prefigurative Communism and the Problem of Workers’ Control, RADICAL AM., Winter 1977-1978,
at 99, 100.
192
Caucus Statement, Dual Power: A Strategy to Build Socialism in Our Time,
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISTS AM.-LIBERTARIAN SOCIALIST CAUCUS, (Dec. 31,
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to develop non-profit counter-institutions, what this Article calls a
“hub-and-spoke” structure.
Section III.A describes how the hub-and-spoke structure arose
out of the common anti-authoritarian organizing tactic called the affinity group. Section III.B then details how activists have developed
this organizing tool into a non-profit corporate structure.
A. Affinity Group Structures
For decades, anti-authoritarian activists have worked through
small, decentralized, collaborative “affinity groups,” groups typically made up of five to fifteen activists that may collaborate with
other individuals or groups, but that are fully free to take action without direction or guidance from some higher body or organization.193
The model is a flexible one that has been used in different ways and
in different contexts, but the ultimate goal of the affinity group structure is to maximize the autonomy of the small group while allowing
it to remain connected to a broader community of activists through
either General Assemblies, gatherings of all members of related affinity groups that coordinate their work through direct democracy,194 or spokescouncils, gatherings of a reporter from all affinity
groups connected to one another through a larger network of allied
affinity groups.195 Affinity groups commonly make decisions
through a process activists call “consensus,” which operates somewhat like Consent does in the sociocratic model.196 This activist
2018), https://dsa-lsc.org/2018/12/31/dual-power-a-strategy-to-build-socialismin-our-time/. These anti-authoritarian principles are more fully explored supra
notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
193
DAVID GRAEBER, DIRECT ACTION: AN ETHNOGRAPHY 288–89 (2009); URI
GORDON, ANARCHY ALIVE: ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS FROM PRACTICE TO
THEORY 16 (2008).
194
GORDON, supra note 193 at 15–16.
195
GRAEBER, supra note 193, at 289.
196
See Haber, supra note 25, at 334–35 (describing the intended use of “consensus” in the Occupy Movement, a process in which a General Assembly was
asked to refine a proposal until no one blocked it, and blocks were only to be
reserved for rare situations in which a person had a very serious ethical or safetyrelated about a proposal). In sociocratic organizations, the Consent process is
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model of affinity groups managing their own semi-autonomous projects and reporting back to a collective body of all members from
other affinity groups or, for larger bodies, designated reporters from
each group, dates back to the 1970s network of nonviolent activist
collectives called Movement for a New Society, and was adopted by
several other movements and groups over time: the anti-nuclear
movement; 1980s radical LGBTQ groups like ACT UP; radical environmental groups like Earth First! and the Earth Liberation Front
in the 1980s and 1990s; the anti-globalization movement in the late
1990s; and the Occupy Movement in the 2000s.197 This affinity
group model was adopted by activists operating in a non-profit organizational context to form the core of the hub-and-spoke nonprofit counter-institution model.198
B. The Hub-and-Spoke Form at Activist Non-Profits
In the hub-and-spoke non-profit corporate structure, a nonprofit’s constitutive elements—its committees, members, employees, and Board—are mapped onto an activist General Assembly or
spokescouncil structure. Depending on the size of the organization,
either all people affiliated with the organization or just delegates
from each affinity group coordinate and collaborate through a central collective, hub, or steering committee that does not direct the
work of the individual affinity groups but may help set the general
direction for the organization with the input of all in the organization, and may help to coordinate activities between the different affinity groups.199 In most versions of this model, the central hub is
commonly intertwined with the Circle process itself, with each Circle member
sequentially asked to speak on each proposal even if all would approve of the
proposal without debate. See supra notes 52–60 and accompanying text. Consensus processes often work that same way, but in some activist groups, especially
larger ones, meeting facilitators ask participants generally if anyone has any questions or concerns, or, especially, serious concerns that might lead them to block a
proposal, but facilitators do not necessarily ask each member to speak on every
proposal. Haber, supra note 25, at 334–35.
197
Haber, supra note 25, at 326–29.
198
Id.
199
The Spokescouncil (or Delegates’ Meeting), SEEDS FOR CHANGE,
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distinct from the non-profit Board, which is moved, at least symbolically, to the organizational periphery, as one affinity group among
others—even if certain legal responsibilities continue to be the domain of that particular affinity group.
One of the first groups to look at ways to bring affinity group
models into a non-profit corporate context was the Sylvia Rivera
Law Project (“SRLP”).200 SRLP was created in August 2002 to address the poverty and over-incarceration of low-income transgender
people and transgender people of color.201 Influenced by the serviceprovision models of the Black Panther Party and the Young Lords,
as well as by critiques of the non-profit industrial complex, SRLP
aims to provide legal assistance and other services to the transgender
community in an explicitly politicized context.202 Although the
group was originally supported by law-fellowship funding and
housed within the Urban Justice Center, a progressive but traditionally-structured legal services organization in New York, SRLP split
from the Urban Justice Center in order to “create a fully trans organization governed in some way that would resist the typical race, gender, and class dynamics of poverty law organizations.”203
As it became an independent organization, instead of looking to
the organizational models of larger non-profit LGBTQ groups for
inspiration and guidance, SRLP members studied the structures of a
variety of activist groups and collectives, and ultimately developed
an organizational model that looks quite like a network of affinity
groups that coordinates its work through a collective General Assembly of all members of those affinity groups.204 The collective is
built around six such co-equal affinity groups, which SRLP calls
teams: (1) the Direct Services Team, which operates SRLP’s legal
clinic and advocates for policy reform to change the institutions that
https://www.seedsforchange.org.uk/spokescouncil (last visited Apr. 28, 2019).
200
See Haber, supra note 25, at 348–49.
201
SRLP History, SYLVIA RIVERA L. PROJECT, http://www.srlp.org/
about/srlp-history (last visited Aug. 11, 2018).
202
See Rickke Mananzala & Dean Spade, The Nonprofit Industrial Complex
and Trans Resistance, 5 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y. 53, 63 (2008).
203
Id. at 64.
204
Id.
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negatively impact low-income transgender people and transgender
people of color; (2) the Public Education Team, which coordinates
trainings, online resources, media, and publications; (3) the Fundraising and Finance Team, which fundraises and manages the organization’s financial systems; (4) the Organizing Support Team, which
links SRLP to other community-based organizations and connects
SRLP members to other resources and opportunities for organizing
on issues that affect them; (5) the Collective Development Team,
which recruits new collective members and is responsible for internal anti-oppression work; and (6) the Board Team, the legally-responsible non-profit corporate Board that generally tries to limit its
oversight to the minimum-required legal and financial duties for the
organization.205 Like affinity groups, these bodies work largely independently from each other, as the collective delegates decisionmaking and implementation power to those six teams as much as
possible.206 Coordination and accountability are encouraged through
the creation of annual work plans that are used to make sure that the
“broad strokes of programming” are approved by the broader collective.207 The collective of all affinity groups meets twice each year
to present their work for the year, give progress reports, discuss priorities, and coordinate their work.208

205

Haber, supra note 25, at 349 (citing SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, SRLP
COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK 1–2, 12 (2009), http://srlp.org/files/collective%20handbook%202009.pdf [hereinafter SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK]).
206
Id. at 350.
207
Mananzala & Spade, supra note 202, at 65.
208
Id.
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Figure 4. A hub-and-spoke non-profit counter-institution209

Consistent with anti-authoritarian activists’ typical approach to
affinity group decision-making, the teams and the larger collective
all use consensus processes for decision-making.210 Unlike in the
worker self-directed non-profit model, most of the SRLP collective
members are volunteers, not paid employees. 211 To help promote
accountability among these different teams made up of largely volunteers, SLRP requires that each team have at least one full-time
staff person on it.212 Similarly, to further promote consistency and
accountability, all collective members are asked to commit to working with the group for at least a year at a specified number of hours
each month.213 The Collective Development Team makes sure that

209

See SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK, supra note 205, at 5 (presenting a similar structure for their organization).
210
Id. at 2, 14.
211
Cf. Mananzala & Spade, supra note 202, at 65.
212
SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK, supra note 205, at 1; Mananzala
& Spade, supra note 202, at 65.
213
SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK, supra note 205, at 21.
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each team maintains a majority of people of color as well as a majority of trans, intersex, or gender-nonconforming people.214 Volunteers, staff, and Board all participate in the twice-yearly collective
meetings, and, like in a General Assembly, all have an equal say in
decision-making for the collective.215 Maintenance of their egalitarian, participatory structure is part of the core mission of the group,216
as SRLP aims not just to provide legal services and organize around
issues affecting low-income trans communities and trans communities of color, but to “create structures that model our vision of a more
just society . . . . [and] to use a non-hierarchical structure to support
work that aims to redistribute power and wealth for a more just society.”217
Other non-profit groups have experimented with similar models.
Inspired by SRLP and the Occupy Movement, Mayday Community
Space (“Mayday”) is a community space and a home for community
organizations and social movements in the historically low-income
and predominantly Latino—but rapidly gentrifying—neighborhood
of Bushwick, Brooklyn.218 Mayday seeks to use the space to build
connections between different groups of activists, different movements, and local community residents, to foster a “broader social
justice community, allowing for the cross-pollination of ideas and
relationships,”219 all in a context of political solidarity and horizontalism.220 The organizational structure developed by Mayday shares
214

Mananzala & Spade, supra note 202, at 65.
SRLP, FROM THE BOTTOM UP, supra note 26, at 12–13.
216
SRLP COLLECTIVE MEMBER HANDBOOK, supra note 205, at 1.
217
Id.
218
MAYDAY SPACE, MAYDAY SPACE HANDBOOK 3 (2018),
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1W5p9AKFbHGLUhZKY_zfGxVontKbvg
2ZopSfIHQoaaSU/
219
Id. at 4.
220
To use the space, Mayday requires that individuals and groups agree to an
anti-oppression statement, which includes commitments to, among other things,
“a political culture grounded in solidarity, respect, listening, cooperation, kindness and non-dogmatism,” “prioritize conflict de-escalation over police involvement,” “ongoing awareness of our prejudices, the structures of oppression that
affect our personal experiences, and our privileges (by virtue of being white, male,
215
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much in common with SRLP, with a similar core collective that coordinates activities between different affinity groups and a preference for consensus decision-making.221 The Mayday Collective is
responsible for day-to-day project management and oversight of
Mayday by consensus rules, although if consensus cannot be
achieved, the collective acccepts a fallback of a two-thirds supermajority to approve a proposal.222
IV. SWARM ORGANIZATIONS
Like sociocracy, the concept of the swarm organization was initially developed by one person who came to experiment with new
organizational structures after working in the worlds of technology
and entrepreneurship. Rick Falkvinge is a Swedish technologist
whose opposition to copyright law norms led him to found the Swedish Pirate Party and develop the idea of the swarm organization in
the process.223 Section IV.A will focus on the core model of the
swarm organization developed by Falkvinge, and Section IV.B will
describe different ways that U.S. activist groups have been experimenting with that model in their organizations.
A. The Pirate Party and the Birth of Swarm Organizations
Falkvinge tells the origin story of the Swedish Pirate Party this
way: he had the idea to create a political party that catered to the 1.2
million Swedish citizens who were violating copyright law through
illegal file sharing; he made a “very rudimentary” website, and
wrote a one-sentence post announcing the new site on a file-sharing
website on January 1, 2006.224 By the next day, the Swedish Pirate
Party was national news, and by 2009 Pirate Parties had a presence
cis-gendered, able-bodied, a U.S. citizen, wealthy, and/or straight, among other
identities) in this society,” and “hearing each other and creating opportunities for
all voices to be heard, especially those that have been historically marginalized or
silenced.” Id. at 7–8.
221
Haber, supra note 25, at 351–52.
222
MAYDAY SPACE, supra note 218, at 6–7.
223
RICK FALKVINGE, SWARMRISE: THE TACTICAL MANUAL TO CHANGING
THE WORLD 13, 15 (2013).
224
Id. at 13, 27–33.
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in dozens of countries and received 225,915 votes in the European
Parliamentary elections—a rate of growth “unlike anything the
MBAs have seen.”225
To organize the new members and volunteers of the Swedish
Pirate Party, Falkvinge sought to create a structure that allowed for
maximizing scalability and rapid growth while retaining trust among
group members—what he came to call a “swarm organization.”226
225
Id. at 13, 27–33, 187. Other notable Pirate Parties include the Pirate Parties
of Germany and Iceland, both of which are built around new tools for large-group
decision-making that allow individual members to vote through either representatives or direct-democratic voting on any one decision, including “liquid democracy” and “liquid feedback.” Alexander Kolokotronis & Sam Nakayama, Groundwork to a Socialist Party: A Democratized Caucus Within the Democratic Party,
GRASSROOTS ECON. ORGANIZING, http://www.geo.coop/blog/groundwork-social
ist-party-democratized-caucus-within-democratic-party (last visited Apr. 19,
2019). See Dominik Schiener, Liquid Democracy: True Democracy for the 21st
Century, MEDIUM (Nov. 23, 2015), https://medium.com/organizer-sandbox/liquid-democracy-true-democracy-for-the-21st-century-7c66f5e53b6f;
Melanie
Sevcenko, Pirate Party Docks at Berlin’s Parliament, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 31,
2012), https://psmag.com/news/pirate-party-docks-at-berlins-parliament-39443.
The social impact of these Pirate Parties has been very mixed. The Pirate
Party of Iceland found parliamentary success in Iceland’s 2016 elections, campaigning for radical institutional reforms and more direct democracy. Agence
France-Presse in Reykjavik, Iceland’s Pirate Party Invited to Form Government,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/02/iceland-pirate-party-invited-form-government-coalition. But the German Pirate
Party’s original leadership left the party over a variety of scandals and the group’s
tolerance for political amateurism and resistance to a clear ideological vision has
been argued to have helped lay the groundwork for the rise of the far-Right Alternative für Deutschland party. Josephnie Huetlin, The Rise and Fall of the Pirate
Party, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 29, 2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/137305
/rise-fall-pirate-party (linking the disarray of the German Pirate Party, “part performance art, part cult, part prank,” to the rise of Alternative für Deutschland,
“very much a party, with ideological convictions and a thirst for power”).
Similar experiments with online tools for participatory democracy at the level
of the state have been proposed or experimented with in Argentina, Taiwan, and
Spain. Kolokotronis & Nakayama, supra (describing the Net Party in Argentina
and their platform DemocracyOS, online participatory voting tools developed by
the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, and the influence of social movements on
city-level electoral politics in Barcelona and Madrid).
226
FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 57–58. Other organizations and businesses
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The swarm organization “consists almost entirely of loosely knit activists,”227 but—designed by Falkvinge with the specific goal of being more coordinated than leaderless activist groups like the Occupy
Movement and Anonymous228—the swarm of activists is organized
around a structure or a “scaffolding” of officers and organizational
roles that support the activists.229 The Swedish Pirate Party was organized by geography, so it was structured around small groups representing a county, city, or urban district, all arranged in a series of
“mini-pyramids.”230 The model is designed to be scalable, so a structure might initially only be filled at the county level, but, as the
group grows, each level expands to have individuals populate each
box of a sprawling organizational chart.231

have used the “swarm” metaphor to describe their operations or management, including some that predate Falkvinge. See Vladimir Dimitrov, Swarm-Like Dynamics and Their Use in Organization and Management 12 COMPLEX SYSTEMS
413 (2000). Today, activist groups using the label are most closely inspired by
Falkvinge. A renewed interest in how swarms in nature operate began within the
field of artificial intelligence in the 1990s, which perhaps led to interest in the
concept among technologists like Falkvinge. The term “swarm intelligence” was
introduced by Gerardo Beni and Jing Wang in an influential 1989 paper, and the
term has become widely used in the fields of robotics and artificial intelligence to
describe collective behavior that acts with “intelligence” even if its individual,
autonomous parts are unaware of the group’s purpose, like ants building a colony,
the growth of bacteria, or certain artificial intelligence designs. See Gerardo Beni
& Jing Wang, Swarm Intelligence in Cellular Robotic Systems, in ROBOTS AND
BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: TOWARDS A NEW BIONICS? 703, 703–12 (Pablo Dario et
al. eds., 1993).
227
FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 45.
228
Id. at 11.
229
Id. at 45–46.
230
Id. at 54–56.
231
Id. at 70–72.
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Figure 5. A section of a swarm organizational chart232

Like sociocracy, the swarm model is built around small groups,
but there are not formal, coordinated links from one small group to
the next; instead, “everybody communicates with everybody else
all the time.”233 The swarm structure is built around groups of no
more than seven people, which Falkvinge argues is the maximum
size for effective collaboration because larger groups require spending too much time and effort on relationship management.234 Ultimately, in every part of these geographical groupings, there should
be up to, but no more than, seven leaders, and each of those leaders
could have a variety of sub-leaders and deputies.235 For example, in
Figure 5, a person coordinating city-level work may have one or two
deputies and four “function officers”: a public relations or media
person responsible for working with newspapers, television, and radio; an activism leader whose job is to support the practical details
for activists in the swarm, like getting permits or obtaining loudspeaker equipment; a swarmcare leader responsible for welcoming
new members and monitoring the swarm; and an information and
web leader who maintains the online presence for the local work of
the swarm.236 Each of the function officers may have deputies, but
most of the work should be coordinated in teams of no more than
232
233
234
235
236

Id. at 56.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 61–63.
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seven people, and when groups in the swarm start to outgrow that
number, leaders should consider sub-dividing them, for instance, dividing the City into no more than seven neighborhoods or districts.237 While leaders formally appoint volunteers to these roles,
the goal is that people should be given these titles after they have
already informally stepped into these roles: “the organizational chart
should lag slightly behind the observed reality.”238
The leader and officer roles in swarm organizations may be less
top-down than they sound. The swarm officers, for Falkvinge,
should not be managers in a traditional sense, but rather should be
responsible for making sure the swarm “has everything it needs to
self-organize,” not telling people in the swarm what to do, but rather: (1) promoting speed by removing organizational bottlenecks;
(2) improving trust among members of the swarm by maintaining
strict transparency; and (3) improving scalability by building the
scaffolding to its full size from the start of the swarm so that people
can join and easily find a place for their work.239
In addition to all of these small groups that help to structure the
activism of the swarm,240 Falkvinge acknowledges that larger
groups may sometimes be necessary for formal and informal communication and coordination among both officers and activists
within the swarm. But in order to encourage the group to grow efficiently, he argues that leaders must aim to cap even informal largegroup discussion at 150 people.241 A more useful size for a larger
group, he argues, is a group of no more than thirty people, an “extended family” who all know each other, but who do not typically
collaborate closely.242 This might include an assembled group of all
officers and leaders for a certain function or a certain geography.243
All of these numerical targets should be monitored by officers and
leaders and when a group grows beyond those targets, it should be
237
238
239
240
241
242
243

See id. at 62.
Id. at 63-64.
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56–58.
Id. at 59.
Id.
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split.244 Officers and leaders must be willing to make and enforce
such splits, to appoint other officers, delegate authority, take on deputies or assistants, and to do so without direction from any supervisor.245
From the perspective of an individual member of the swarm, the
swarm should be decentralized and collaborative, with authority delegated “to the point where anybody can make almost any decision
for the entire organization.”246 It should be open to anyone and its
operations should be transparent, with financial information and discussions of strategy and tactics open for the participation of all members.247 The model encourages collaboration and communication
among members of the swarm and aims for people working in one
part of the swarm to learn from what others in the swarm are doing;
toward that end, the swarm should have some kind of digital or physical work space for sharing ideas, slogans, campaigns, and any other
information that falls within the overall vision of the swarm.248
The swarm organization model shares a number of elements in
common with the other organizational models described in Parts I
through III. The small coordinating groups call to mind sociocracy,
although Falkvinge retreats from the Consent decision-making
model of Sociocracy, instead arguing that small group decisionmaking should be done through what he calls a “consensus circle,”
which requires the unanimity of all present in order to agree to any
action.249 Like in the hub-and-spoke counter-institution, there is
great freedom for individuals in the swarm to choose their own activities, and to work toward goals in a self-managed way, allowing
activists in the swarm to form their own projects and collaborate as
they see fit.250

244

Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 203. To facilitate that power, the swarm’s organizational chart should
initially have “tons of empty boxes everywhere.” Id.
246
Id. at 14.
247
Id. at 19–20.
248
Id. at 96.
249
Id. at 165–67.
250
Id. at 63.
245
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While parts of the swarm organization parallel the other activist
organization models, in other ways Falkvinge seems to have been
unable to escape conventional corporate models and the start-up culture from which he emerged, as can be seen most clearly in the
unique role he reserves for organizational founders. In his model,
the founder should set the vision and specific goals for the swarm,
as without one or more specific goals, the swarm could be lost to
“discussing its purpose in life.”251 Beyond that, because the participants in the swarm have substantial freedom to set their specific
tasks toward the larger goal, he argues that it is essential that the
founder establish the culture of the swarm, so that critical work processes do not become obscured by lengthy debates into processes,
conflict resolution procedures, or similar discussions that can grind
the swarm’s work to a halt.252 There appears to be no mechanism for
the organization to move away from the founder’s original vision,
which risks entrenching internal hierarchy and founder’s syndrome253 even more than “professionalized” non-profit organizations, where there is ordinarily some process by which an organization’s Board or members could amend corporate bylaws or modify
the organizations’s purpose.254
This creep of hierarchy can be seen in other parts of Falkvinge’s
model as well. While the swarm structure is described as non-hierarchical and autonomous, it is hard to imagine that a city-level of-

251

Id. at 87.
Id. at 87–88.
253
Founder’s syndrome is widely discussed among both business and nonprofit start-ups and refers to organizational founders who are unable to delegate
authority or allow investors or others to take any authority over an organization.
See Noam Wasserman, The Founder’s Dilemma, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 2008),
https://hbr.org/2008/02/the-founders-dilemma; Stephen R. Block & Steven Rosenberg, Toward an Understanding of Founder’s Syndrome: An Assessment of
Power and Privilege Among Founders of Nonprofit Organizations, 12 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 353, 354 (2002).
254
See, e.g., Joanne Fritz, When and How to Legally Change Your Nonprofit’s
Mission, BALANCE SMALL BUS., https://www.thebalancesmb.com/legallychange-your-nonprofits-mission-2502228 (last updated Nov. 18, 2018) (describing the process to amend a typical non-profit’s mission or purpose).
252
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ficer who is invited by a county-level officer to attend a thirty-person coordination team meeting is not, at least in some ways, made
to feel more central or more important to the organization than activists who are not invited to that meeting.255 Even beyond that,
Falkvinge is quite honest in his description of the need to take uncompromising, top-down action against internal critics.256 He describes multiple strategies for dealing with “mavericks,” those who
would go counter to “swarmthink,” including manipulative strategies like showering attention on a maverick’s allies for work that
comports with the founder’s vision in order to isolate the dissenter
and reduce his or her influence within the swarm.257 While activist
organizations may sometimes need to take steps to remove an agent
provocateur or someone aiming to intentionally tear apart the group,
Falkvinge’s embrace of strong-arm tactics toward “mavericks”
points to his tendency to put efficiency and loyalty to the founder’s
original vision above a deep commitment to prefigurative politics.
B. Activist Groups Adopt the Swarm Organization Model
Despite the presence of these hierarchical elements in
Falkvinge’s swarm model, several noteworthy U.S. activist groups
have looked to the idea of the swarm organization for inspiration.
This Section will look at how U.S. groups have begun to experiment
with the swarm model and the changes they have made to
Falkvinge’s original vision. It will consider three groups that have
embraced some version of the swarm organization, less to shed light
on any of these specific groups than to show how this trend among
activist organizations is emerging: IfNotNow, which organizes Jewish people in the United States to fight against the Israeli occupation

255

Indeed, having clear rules on how to progress up a hierarchy might well be
preferable to a hierarchy that is obscured or invisible, thriving on friendship
cliques, interpersonal power dynamics, and unwritten rules. See generally Jo Freeman, The Tyranny of Structurelessness, JOFREEMAN.COM, https://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
256
See FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 180–81.
257
Id. (reminding would-be founders to always “remember that an organization is people, and that attention is reward”).
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of Palestine;258 Movimiento Cosecha, a movement organization that
fights for “permanent protection, dignity, and respect” for undocumented immigrants in the United States;259 and Demand Utopia, a
communalist group that aims for a “new imaginative order . . . that
advance[s] images and ideals of a world beyond the shackles and
social divides of this one.”260 All three aim to be national organizations with active, decentralized memberships, and while none may
be conventionally stuctured non-profits, IfNotNow is a non-profit
corporation chartered in Washington D.C., and both IfNotNow and
Movimiento Cosecha receive tax-deductible donations.261
IfNotNow and Movimiento Cosecha share much in common, and
both groups were shaped by participation in training programs run
by a group called Momentum, a “training institute and movement
incubator” that helps to launch activist groups using the swarm
model.262
258

Our Strategy, IFNOTNOW, https://ifnotnowmovement.org/about-us/ourstrategy/ (last visted Feb. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Our Strategy, IFNOTNOW].
259
About Our Movement, COSECHA, https://www.lahuelga.com/about/ (last
visited Feb. 19, 2019) [hereinafter About Our Movement, COSECHA].
260
About: Can We Build a New World in the Ashes of the Old?, DEMAND
UTOPIA, https://demandutopia.net/about/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) [hereinafter
About, DEMAND UTOPIA].
261
IfNotNow has 501(c)(3) status. See Tax Exempt Organizations Search,
IfNotNow, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://apps.irs.gov/app/eos/displayAll.do?dispatchMethod=displayAllInfo&Id=649963&ein=475178715 (last visited Apr. 19, 2019). Both IfNotNow and Movimiento Cosecha receive tax-exempt
donations through a fiscal sponsor, Act Blue Charities. See Donate, COSECHA,
https://secure.actblue.com/donate/cosecha?refcode=lahuelganavesp (last visited
Mar. 21, 2019); Support IfNotNow in Fighting for Freedom and Dignity for All
Israelis and Palestinians, IFNOTNOW, https://secure.actblue.com/donate/
ifnotnow?refcode=Website (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
262
MOMENTUM, https://www.momentumcommunity.org/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2019); Momentum Movements, MOMENTUM, https://www.momentumcommunity.org/movements (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). In addition to Movimiento Cosecha and IfNotNow, Momentum has more recently worked with the climate-justice organization, Sunrise Movement. Id. IfNotNow credits Momentum and Movimiento Cosecha with teaching it “the swarm language.” Healing Justice Podcast: Building Liberatory Movement Cultures – IfNotNow, PODBEAN (Feb. 13,
2018), https://www.podbean.com/media/share/pb-pp4ep-86fa2d.
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To look at how these groups have modified Falkvinge’s model,
elements of the swarm model will be divided into three sections: (1)
parts of the swarm model that are consistent with anti-authoritarian
values and in line with the previously described activist non-profit
experiments; (2) parts of the swarm model that are inconsistent with
those values, like the unique position Falkvinge reserves for the
founder’s vision for the group; and (3) parts of the swarm model that
aim for efficiency but that may ultimately hold little value.
1. ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN ELEMENTS OF THE SWARM MODEL
The elements of the swarm model that are most in line with antiauthoritarian principles have been embraced by all three of these
groups. IfNotNow, Movimiento Cosecha, and Demand Utopia each
preserve or expand on member autonomy and self-management
throughout the organization, and all highlight the ability of all members to communicate freely across parts of the broader swarm.263
In a series of videos showing a training session coordinated by a
group called Ayni Institute, members of IfNotNow, Movimiento
Cosecha, and other groups present an in-depth description of how
they use the swarm model.264 Although they do not always describe
exactly how their specific groups may differ from each other or the
degree to which they may have modified Falkvinge’s model, they
focus substantial attention on how their groups are structured autonomously, or, in one description of this model, how each operates as
a “decentralized, self-organized smart network.”265 IfNotNow allows any three or more members to autonomously “decide to take
an action, build a community event, hold a Shabbat dinner, [or do]
anything that builds community and works to end the occupation.”266 Demand Utopia puts a similar emphasis on autonomy and
263

See generally Our Strategy, IFNOTNOW, supra note 258; About Our Movement, COSECHA, supra note 259; About, DEMAND UTOPIA, supra note 260.
264
See, e.g., Ayni Institute, SWARM 4: Self-Organizing Decentralized Networks, Part 1, YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=sYkXsYMhHdA [hereinafter Anyi Institute, SWARM 4].
265
See id. (discussing the format of a “decentralized, self-organized smartnetwork” at 21:20–21:35).
266
Judaism Unbound Podcast: Episode 124: IfNotNow – Ilana Levinson, Jill
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freedom for its members, emphasizing “the three utopian rule”: “if
three utopians agree on an action, they can act in the name of the
organization . . . no permission is necessary!”267 For Demand Utopia, the goal is to provide “creative agency” for members to develop
their own activities in support of their organizational goals.268 With
that freedom comes the need for individual members to take responsibility for the overall organization’s work: “if you think something
needs to be done, you just do it, without asking anybody. If other
people think that your initiative is good, they will join in. . . . It is
every activist’s right and responsibility to go where he or she feels
he or she can contribute the most.”269 Some IfNotNow members describe how they value that autonomy precisely because it departs
from the failings identified by critics of the non-profit industrial
complex: “[T]here’s not a staff hierarchy making all the key decisions. . . . [Decisions are] based on what we actually want and need
and think is important, and not based on fundraising decisions which
often [are] in the mix when you have a staff and board structure.”270
All three groups also underscore the importance of the free flow
of information around their groups. IfNotNow and Movimiento Cosecha describe how communication does not go from the top down,
but should circulate freely around throughout the swarm, as different
seven-person groups get information from other seven-person
groups on how they may have coordinated some action.271 Demand
Utopia, similarly, aims for “people [to] inspire one another across
all levels and all geographies, with the only common factor being
the overall goals of the Swarm.”272
Raney, JUDAISM UNBOUND (June 22, 2018), https://www.judaismunbound.com/
podcast/2018/6/22/judaism-unbound-episode-124-ifnotnow.
267
DEMAND UTOPIA, HIVE BY-LAWS 3, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1uwMhLN1iJcMHoohy5vKyoeRq06WuPY4I05pD_AZnyFs/edit [hereinafter DEMAND UTOPIA BY-LAWS].
268
Coffee with Comrades Podcast: Episode 30: “A Life Cult” ft. Demand Utopia, COFFEE WITH COMRADES (Jan. 28, 2019), http://coffeewithcomrades.com/
website/episode-30-a-life-cult-ft-demand-utopia.
269
Id.
270
Judaism Unbound Podcast, supra note 266.
271
See Ayni Institute, SWARM 4, supra note 264.
272
See DEMAND UTOPIA BY-LAWS, supra note 267, at 1.
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2. REGRESSIVE ELEMENTS OF THE SWARM MODEL
The swarm model presented by Falkvinge contains elements that
seem inconsistent with anti-authoritarian principles, and out of step
with the approaches taken by the other activist organizational models described in this Article. This is clear in both the substantial
power reserved for the organizational founder such that there appears to be no realistic way for the organization to change direction
or tactics without that individual, and in Falkvinge’s willingness to
launch top-down, even manipulative efforts to isolate those who
would raise concerns about the overall workings of the group.273
Few of these attributes appear to be embraced by the activist
groups considered in this Section, and in some cases, steps have
been taken to modify Falkvinge’s model to be more democratic. One
helpful concept here is articulated by Carlos Saavedra, a founder of
both the Ayni Institute and Momentum and a member of Movimiento Cosecha,274 who distinguishes between a “decentralized
organization with centralized design” and a “decentralized organization with decentralized design.”275 Movimiento Cosecha is clear
that it has a centralized design and describes its process as one of
“frontloading,” with “rules, procedures, structure, vision established
explicitly at the beginning of the process, so we can operate with as
much autonomy as possible while retaining unity.”276 This sounds
somewhat like the Swedish Pirate Party model, but Movimiento Cosecha also notes that its model did not spring forth from one sole
founder, but was developed by a group of activists and organizers
collaborating over the course of two years of planning.277 The group
273

See FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 180–81.
Our Team, AYNI INST., https://ayni.institute/our-team/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2019); Meet Our Team, MOMENTUM, https://www.momentumcommunity.org/
team (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
275
Ayni Institute, SWARM 2: What is Decentralized Organization? Part 2,
YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=h7Q2-SgwBtg&
(distinguishing between decentralized organizations with centralized control and
decentralized organizations with decentralized control at 15:20–16:28).
276
Id. (discussing frontloading at 21:35–23:30).
277
Id. (discussing the development of a “completely decentralized organization” from 20:55–21:15).
274
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does not describe any efforts to manipulate or isolate members who
do not go along with the founders’ vision, but the “decentralized
organization with centralized design” concept does raise the question of what should happen when members of the organization have
concerns about the overall organization’s design, goals, or culture.278 Falkvinge answers this question with a top-down, authoritarian answer, but Movimiento Cosecha and other groups embracing
the “decentralized organization with centralized design” framework
do not appear to have publicly addressed this question yet.279
Demand Utopia takes a radically different approach, one that
presents a clear path for members to change the overall organization.280 While Demand Utopia retains the mini-pyramid structure of
the Swedish Pirate Party, it upends the logic of the mini-pyramids
when it gets to the highest levels of the structure.281 Unlike in
Falkvinge’s original model, where the highest levels come closer
and closer to the founder and, presumably, his or her deputies, allies,
and others who are likely to share a common vision,282 Demand Utopia makes the top level of the scaffolding a General Assembly, an
annual gathering open to substantially all active organizational
members, a group specifically tasked with assessing the strategic vision for the group and making changes to the goals or structure of
the group if necessary.283 Although this makes the largest decisionmaking body for the organization far more democratic, it remains
partially restricted, as attendance at the General Assembly is only
open to members who have reached the rank of “Green One,” which
is obtained by completing three tasks (“badges”) that are aligned
with the organization’s mission and “being vouched for by at least
two” other members.284 In this approach, much depends on how
these rules are enforced and how restrictive or unrestrictive members are at “vouching” for newcomers; still, Demand Utopia’s model
278
279
280
281
282
283
284

See id.
See id.
See DEMAND UTOPIA BY-LAWS, supra note 267, at 5–9.
Id. at 7.
FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 55–56.
DEMAND UTOPIA BY-LAWS, supra note 267, at 4.
Id.
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attempts to balance preserving the group’s original vision with allowing for meaningful membership control over even the fundamentals of the organization’s goals, strategy, and structure.
3. ELEMENTS OF THE SWARM MODEL THAT SEEK EFFICIENCY
WITHOUT HIERARCHY
Mission-driven organizations that grant autonomy to their members to undertake critical tasks for the organization without any topdown direction understandably tend to be very concerned with efficiency. Where the sociocratic model uses a hierarchy of Circles, and
where both the worker self-directed non-profit and the hub-andspoke models constrain their Boards, leaving some traditionally
Board-led work to a collective of workers or members, swarm organizations highlight the autonomy of their small groups, even when
some underlying hierarchy continues to exist, and without much discussion of a Board—even when one exists.285
Despite sometimes retaining Boards and officers, swarm organizations generally do not seem to rely on Board direction and topdown structures to impose efficiency like professionalized non-profits do. Instead, Falkvinge’s model places significant faith in the
power of small teams of no more than seven people to work efficiently. Interestingly, the groups described in this section seem, to
some degree, to depart from Falkvinge’s faith in the power of working in teams of seven people. Both Movimiento Cosecha and
IfNotNow seem to identify less with the mini-pyramid scaffolding
285

IfNotNow, for instance, has a Board that seems to lead on certain administrative, governance, and fundraising matters, even if it remains relatively handsoff when it comes to programmatic oversight. Judaism Unbound Podcast, supra
note 266 (“I was about to say we don’t have a Board, but for administrative and
fundraising reasons we do actually have a 501(c)(3) status and a Board. But some
very smart people put that Board together and by-laws together in ways that make
that Board separate from our decision-making.”). Similarly, the Sunrise Movement, while using the swarm organization model for its organizing, is also built
around affiliated 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) entities, each with Boards and officers.
See Tax Returns, SUNRISE MOVEMENT, https://www.sunrisemovement.org/taxreturns; Sunrise Movement Education Fund, GUIDESTAR, https://www.guide
star.org/profile/46-4773036.
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and more closely with a “decentralized, self-organized network,”
which they depict as shaped more like a circle.286 Demand Utopia
does retain the scaffolding of mini-pyramids in its model,287 but departs radically from the Swedish Pirate Party structure at its highest
level by situating the group’s ultimate governance and decisionmaking authority in the hands of a General Assembly.288 Unfortunately, none of these groups seem to directly challenge Falkvinge’s
arguments about the importance of working in teams of seven, larger
groups of thirty, and very large groups of 150 people, despite the
very questionable pseudoscience underlying his claims.289
286

See Ayni Institute, SWARM 5: Self-Organizing Decentralized Networks
Part 2, YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
B7bgNQrHbeQ. IfNotNow and Movimento Cosecha are both affiliated with Ayni
Institute and Movement Netlab. About Us, AYNI INST., https://ayni.institute/about/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019); Collaborations, MOVEMENT NETLAB,
https://movementnetlab.org/partners/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
287
Demand Utopia uses something much more like the original model, with a
series of pyramids structured from the smallest groups to the largest: at the bottom
are the leaders of each Cypher (three to seven people); above them are the leaders
of each Pod (three to five Cyphers, roughly thirty people); above them are the
leaders of each Polis (three to five Pods, roughly 150 people); above them are the
leaders of each Zona (three to five Polis, roughly 750 people). DEMAND UTOPIA
BY-LAWS, supra note 267, at 5.
288
See supra notes 282–84 and accompanying text.
289
In an analysis of the Falkvinge model, it bears noting that his arguments
on the efficiency of teams of seven, thirty, and 150 are very questionable.
Falkvinge argues that teams of seven are efficient because for seven people to
have a relationship with one another, there are a total of twenty-one relationships
(A-B, A-C, A-D, A-E, A-F, A-G, A-H, B-C, B-D, etc.); among eight people, there
are twenty-eight relationships. FALKVINGE, supra note 223, at 52–57. So, he reasons, adding an eighth person would add fourteen percent (14%) more work, but
require thirty-three percent (33%) more time to manage the relationships. Id. at
54. Any empirical consideration of a social grouping would show that math to be
flawed, and deeply dependent on the situation. See id. at 52–57. The idea that
managing the relationships of players on a soccer team of eleven players (fiftyfive relationships) would be so radically different from managing the relationships
of players on a baseball team of nine players (thirty-six relationships) that it would
take fifty-two percent (52%) more effort to manage the team’s interpersonal relationships seems more likely to be a mathematical quirk than a verifiable metric.
Falkvinge’s rationale for capping the larger group at 150 people is based on
“Dunbar’s number,” a principle described by British anthropologist Robin Dunbar
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V. GOVERNANCE CONSTRAINTS ON THE
NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFIT MODELS
Informed and inspired by the solidarity economy and commons
movements, the Occupy Movement and the Movement for Black
Lives, anti-authoritarian principles of autonomy, horizontalism, and
prefigurativism, and the critiques of the non-profit industrial complex, activists have been developing innovative non-profit structures
that move away from the professionalized non-profit model to better
reflect their political values. While the structures described in this
Article, and their many potential variations, share certain similarities, there are important differences between these models that activist groups considering non-profit vehicles for their work and their
lawyers should carefully consider in order to create appropriate
structures for their projects. For activist groups that decide to form
about how large a meaningful social network can be. Id. at 57. While it is not at
all clear that the social network Dunbar describes is applicable in this context,
even if it were, there are two substantial problems with how Falkvinge tries to do
so. Falkvinge argues, somewhat in line with Dunbar, that because of the biology
of the human brain, people can only relate to 150 people, and so that should be
the top size of the group. But Dunbar’s argument is that this number is an average,
and people’s actual ability to maintain a social network ranges between 100 and
230 people, and 150 people is a rough estimate of the average. See id.; R.I.M.
Dunbar, Co-Evolution of Neocortex Size, Group Size and Language in Humans,
16 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 681, 686–87 (1993). In other words, if we accept
Falkvinge’s application of Dunbar’s study to the social movement large-group
context, we have inhibited roughly half—the half of people whose brains permit
them to have social networks smaller than the mean—of the group from meaningful participation. Even beyond that, Dunbar’s studies have been criticized by other
anthropologists for relying too much on biological determinants, and not taking
into account social and cultural differences in groups. See Jan de Ruiter et al.,
Dunbar’s Number: Group Size and Brain Physiology in Humans Reexamined,
113 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 557, 557–68 (2011). If anything, these questions seem
more important in a group dealing with often-controversial issues tied up with
questions of race, religion, and identity, like those worked on by Movimiento Cosecha and IfNotNow.
Falkvinge’s argument for working in middle-sized groups of thirty people—
which boils down to that number usually seeming to be manageable—may be his
most compelling, despite not claiming any scientific or mathematical rationale.
Id. at 155.
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non-profit entities, in addition to the challenges of developing nonprofit corporate structures that align with their political values and
that are functional and effective vehicles for their work, these groups
and their lawyers must also ensure that these structures comply with
the requirements of non-profit law and, when applicable, the additional legal requirements that come from exempt-organization tax
law, employment law, and other bodies of law that become more
challenging to navigate the more a group departs from conventional
structures and practices.290
Groups developing these new organizational structures must pay
particular attention to ensuring that their structures permit directors
to fully comply with their fiduciary duties, as it is here that these
new structures make their riskiest departures from safe non-profit
legal norms. Although it is clear that fiduciary duties require that
corporate directors adhere to “something stricter than the morals of
the market place[,]”291 the specific standards of care owed by directors of non-profit organizations to those organizations have changed
over time.292 The long-term trend has seen non-profit directors inching toward being held to the same fiduciary standards as directors of
business corporations,293 but in the twenty-first century, standards
290

Some of these new activist non-profits have obtained tax exemption from
the IRS, and there is no reason that innovative corporate structures would prevent
successfully obtaining tax exemption, although the governance rules specific to
exempt organizations are an additional regulatory hurdle. See infra Section V.B.3.
291
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
292
See Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance:
Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 893–94, 905
(2007) (describing the trend toward imposing business standards on non-profit
Boards and the costs of this trend on the charitable work of non-profits, noting
that “there are many situations in which the rules applicable to for-profit organizations fail to capture the needs of nonprofits”). While nineteenth century nonprofit governance relied heavily on stringent common law principles and charitable trust standards, by the second half of the twentieth century, governance standards appeared to come closer to paralleling those of business corporations. See
Joseph Mead & Michael Pollack, Courts, Constituencies, and the Enforcement of
Fiduciary Duties in the Nonprofit Sector, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 295–96 (2016).
293
The idea that the members of the governing body of a charitable corporation would owe corporate fiduciary duties rather than the duties of the trustees of
a charitable trust would develop slowly, over the course of more than a century.
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of care owed by non-profit and business corporate directors may be
growing apart again, as new federal laws have imposed additional
governance requirements on business corporations that exempt nonprofit corporations,294 and, at the same time, a new governance regime has been imposed on tax-exempt non-profit Boards through
the Internal Revenue Code.295
This Part V divides the legal issues related to governance structure and fiduciary duties that face the new activist non-profits into
two sections. Section V.A describes the duty of care, the duty likely
most at risk of being breached by the structural innovations of these
new activist non-profit models. Section V.B describes the duties of
loyalty and obedience and the governance rules that apply to taxexempt organizations through the Internal Revenue Code, and discusses how these rules impact the new activist forms.
A. The Duty of Care
1. THE DUTY OF CARE AND THE NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFITS
Non-profit directors are required to act with care in how they
govern a non-profit corporation.296 State laws vary in how they de-

Fishman, supra note 18, at 655. In New York, for instance, the 1895 Membership
Corporation Law held that directors could be personally liable for short-term debts
and they had to obtain court approval for leases longer than three years. Id. at 649.
It took until the adoption of the 1970 Not-for-Profit Corporation Law for New
York to use virtually the same requirements for directors’ standards of care and
interested transaction rules as found in the New York Business Corporation Law.
Id. at 649–50.
294
The governance reforms that were instituted after the corporate scandals of
the early 2000s, including The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Public Company
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, and the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 were largely limited to
publicly-held business corporations. Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen,
Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate Governance—A Comprehensive Look at
Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 347, 358 (2012).
295
For a description of the governance rules that have been imposed through
tax administration policies, see infra Section V.B.
296
MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).
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scribe this duty, but most require that directors both act with reasonableness, judged by an “ordinarily prudent person in a like position”
standard, and that they make their decisions based on a subjectively
good faith belief that they are acting in the best interests of the corporation.297 This duty is sometimes described as having two parts:
(1) a duty of attention, a requirement that directors stay reasonably
informed about the corporation, and (2) a duty of reasonable decision-making, a requirement that directors make decisions reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation.298
There are multiple mechanisms that can shield directors from
liability if they are found to have breached the duty of care. First, if
directors are volunteers, as is typical for smaller non-profits, mere
negligence may be insufficient to find a director personally liable,
as courts do not want to discourage people from volunteering to
serve on non-profit Boards.299 Second, directors are protected by the
business judgment rule, sometimes called the “best judgment rule”
in the non-profit context, which provides that directors are not liable
for harm to the organization caused by a mistake of judgment as long
as the director was reasonably informed about the subject of the decision, there was no fraud or illegality in the decision, and the director was able to exercise independent judgment without a disabling
297

See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(a) (West 2019) (“A director shall perform . . . in a manner that director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use in similar circumstances.”); MINN. STAT. §
317A.251 (2018) (“A director shall discharge the duties of the position of director
in good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise under similar circumstances.”); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CORP. § 717(a) (Consol. 2019) (“Directors and officers shall discharge the duties
of their respective positions in good faith and with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.”).
298
Hazen & Hazen, supra note 294, at 375.
299
See, e.g., La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147, 1152 (5th
Cir. 1989). However, this is not a complete bar, and directors have on occasion
been found personally liable for negligent management of assets. See, e.g., Lynch
v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86, 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Vacco v.
Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
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conflict of interest.300 Third, state and federal law offer protections
to directors for violations of the duty of care. Many states provide
statutory immunity from lawsuits based on allegations of the breach
of the duty of care for directors of non-profit organizations, especially if they are serving without compensation.301 Similarly, the
federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997 shields directors of
501(c)(3) tax-exempt non-profits who receive no cash compensation
or noncash compensation of no more than $500 per year from liability in many kinds of third-party lawsuits.302 Fourth, many state
non-profit laws permit or require non-profit organizations to indemnify directors in certain situations,303 although such indemnification
is only meaningful protection for directors of organizations with the
financial resources to pay for the costs of indemnification. A nonprofit may obtain directors’ and officers’ liability insurance to fund
those costs, and such policies should cover both potential liability
and the costs of defending directors against a lawsuit.304
All of these protections and officers provide a significant
amount of safety for directors of non-profit organizations, making
300

Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 2003); Mahan
v. Avera St. Luke’s, 621 N.W.2d 150, 154 (S.D. 2001); Beard v. Achenbach
Mem’l Hosp., 170 F.2d 859, 862 (10th Cir. 1948); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 365 (AM. LAW INST. 2007).
301
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 29-406.90 (2019) (providing immunity for uncompensated volunteers, including directors of non-profit organizations that maintain
liability insurance); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-20.1 (2018) (providing immunity for
uncompensated members, directors, trustees, and officers of non-profit hospitals
and charities if they were acting in good faith and within the scope of their duties);
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 105/108.70 (2018) (providing immunity for directors and
officers of tax-exempt non-profits if the director earns under $25,000 per year and
the act or omission did not involve willful or wanton conduct). See generally,
NONPROFIT RISK MGMT. CTR., STATE LIABILITY LAW FOR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND VOLUNTEERS (2001), https://www.nonprofitrisk.org/app/uploads/
2017/01/state-liability-laws.pdf (last updated 2009) (describing protections from
liability for nonprofits in various states).
302
42 U.S.C. §§ 14503(a), 14505(6) (2012).
303
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 180 § 3 (2019); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CORP. § 722 (2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-881 (Consol. 2019).
304
AM. BAR ASS’N, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 16 (Victor
Futter et al. eds, 2d ed. 2002).
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service on a Board relatively low risk, even for directors who are not
as active in providing oversight as might be ideal. Directors are generally permitted to rely on information prepared by employees,
Board committees on which they do not serve, and on other competent persons without doing an independent investigation into the information reported to them.305 In addition, directors are not required
to manage the day-to-day work of a non-profit organization, only to
set broad organizational policies, oversee corporate agents, and prudently select organizational managers.306 Directors of conventionally structured, professionalized non-profits fail to live up to these
standards somewhat routinely.307 But the less conventionally structured an activist organization is, the more it may attract scrutiny, and
these new activist non-profits should take steps to ensure their directors satisfy the duty of care.
2. BEST PRACTICES FOR THE NEW ACTIVIST NON-PROFITS
TO SATISFY THE DUTY OF CARE
Some of the new activist corporate structures may come close to
delegating Board authority beyond what is allowed by the permissive duty of care standard. In Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National
Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries,308 patients of a
non-profit hospital sued its individual directors for failing to supervise management of the hospital’s investments, not even holding
meetings of the relevant oversight committees for many years.309
The court found that a “[t]otal abdication of the supervisory role” is
305

See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5237, 7236, 9245 (2019); N.Y. NOT-FORPROFIT CORP. § 719; MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.33 (AM. BAR FOUND.
2003).
306
AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 31 (William L. Boyd, III & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 3d ed. 2012)
[hereinafter AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDEBOOK].
307
Id. at 31–33. The failure of directors to live up to this standard is recognized
as a common problem, and directors are rarely found liable for such a failure except in “the most egregious cases such as improper loans or distribution of corporate assets.” JAMES J. FISHMAN, STEPHEN SCHWARZ & LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 138 (5th ed. 2015).
308
381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974).
309
Id. at 1008.
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a violation of the duty of care and that “[a] director who fails to acquire the information necessary to supervise investment policy or
consistently fails even to attend the meetings at which such policies
are considered has violated his fiduciary duty to the corporation.”310
Although directors are allowed to rely on the expertise of those to
whom they have delegated responsibility, “such reliance is a tool for
interpreting the delegate’s reports, not an excuse for dispensing with
or ignoring such reports.”311 This has become the standard for permissible delegation in most states and under the Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act.312
Some of the activist models considered in this Article already
take steps to meet this standard. In the worker self-directed nonprofit model, the Board delegates governance power to “staff trustees,” but the Board still maintains an oversight role, meets regularly, and retains the power to rescind this delegation of authority.313
This is likely permissible under the standards articulated in Stern, as
the Board remains continuously involved in corporate oversight and
retains the power to take action to correct the course of the organization, even if it would require a separate resolution to intervene.
In the hub-and-spoke non-profit counter-institution model, the
Board becomes one of many spokes, with management functions
conducted by a collective comprised of delegates from the various
affinity groups that comprise the organization as a whole.314 Although this structure aims to segregate Board-specific duties like
budgetary oversight and compliance in that Board affinity group,
there is a risk that if affinity groups self-manage their projects with
oversight given only by the collective hub, not the Board, directors
could be found to have breached their duty of care by failing to provide adequate oversight of the organization’s activities.
One way to mitigate that risk is demonstrated by SRLP. At
SRLP, all teams meet twice yearly to present their work for the year
310

Id. at 1014.
Id.
312
MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:
FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 208 (2004).
313
See supra Part II.
314
See supra Part III.
311
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and give progress reports, with the organization as a whole providing consensus approval to the “broad strokes” of programming.315 If
the Board is informed about the activities of the various affinity
groups or spokes of an organization on a semi-annual basis, and if it
has the ability, through the consensus process, to block an action it
finds contrary to the best interests of the organization, that is likely
a sufficient level of oversight for the directors to fulfill their duty of
care.316 This approach provides reasonable protection to their directors, and seems distinguishable from the total abandonment of Board
involvement in Stern.
More generally, the new activist non-profits—even if they intentionally place their Boards at their organizational margins or strip
them of many of their conventional powers—can take steps to minimize risk related to the duty of care. First, Boards should retain an
ability to monitor organizational finances. Even if there is a substantial delegation of authority over programming decisions compared
to the norms of professionalized non-profits, if the Board monitors
organizational finances, or receives and meaningfully reviews reports from a committee or other group reasonably tasked with such
monitoring, directors are likely to not be found liable for a breach of
the duty of care, as directors are rarely found to have breached the
duty of care except in cases of significant financial improprieties,
such as “improper loans or distribution of corporate assets.”317
Similarly, Boards should meet at least annually to review all important organizational or governance matters that have been worked
on by committees, Circles, spokes, members, or any other nonBoard groups.318 In that review, directors should make sure they are
meeting the requirements of the business judgment rule: they have
315

See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.B.
317
FISHMAN, SCHWARZ & MAYER, supra note 307, at 138.
318
There are many guides for non-profit directors that seek to explain their
governance duties. For a detailed, book-length description, see AM. BAR ASS’N,
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 306. For a brief overview of non-profit Boards’ annual
requirements, see Michelle Berger, What Issues Should a Nonprofit Board Consider Annually?, NONPROFIT L. BLOG (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/issues-nonprofit-board-consider-annually/.
316
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made themselves reasonably informed about the subject of a decision, they have reviewed the decision to ensure there is no fraud or
illegality, and they exercise independent judgment without a disabling conflict of interest in their review.319 Groups considering paying their directors should also look at whether state or federal law
would provide directors with additional protections if they are uncompensated.320 Finally, like all non-profits, a non-profit experimenting with these new corporate structures should consider
whether it must or should provide indemnification to their directors
and whether to obtain directors’ and officers’ liability insurance to
further protect their directors and officers.321
Such efforts to ensure that directors satisfy their duty of care not
only serve to protect an organization and its constituents financially
and legally, but can also provide an opportunity for a meaningful
review of decisions made by a decentralized or non-hierarchical organization. Activist non-profits should work to structure such reviews so as not to be back-door efforts to reimpose hierarchy, but
rather as mechanisms to bolster accountability within a decentralized, non-hierarchical group, protecting against the kinds of dramatic missteps that have sometimes occurred when organizations
operate solely through affinity group structures.322

319

See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 301–02 and accompanying text.
321
See supra notes 303–04 and accompanying text.
322
One cautionary example is the Common Ground Collective, an autonomous mutual aid group in New Orleans that provided substantial storm recovery
and rebuilding services after Hurricane Katrina. See Haber, supra note 25, at 346–
48 (citing SCOTT CROW, BLACK FLAGS AND WINDMILLS: HOPE, ANARCHY, AND
THE COMMON GROUND COLLECTIVE (2011)). Members of the group began to
manage a low-income housing development called the Woodlands Complex,
which had fallen into serious disrepair after the storm, and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars to do repairs based on an oral promise to sell the building to them
by the owner of the complex. See Haber, supra note 25, at 347–48. After the collective members made the repairs to the complex, the owner sold the building to
a different owner and evicted the low-income tenants. Id.
320
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B. Duties of Loyalty and Obedience, and Governance Obligations
Arising from the Internal Revenue Code
In addition to the duty of care, non-profit directors owe other
fiduciary duties to their organizations, including the duties of loyalty
and obedience, and duties arising from the Internal Revenue Code
for certain tax-exempt organizations.
1. DUTY OF LOYALTY
The duty of loyalty addresses situations in which a director has
a direct or indirect conflict of interest, and includes prohibitions on
self-dealing and the usurpation of corporate opportunity.323 Loyalty
should remain an important concern for the new activist non-profits.
As with all non-profits, if a director or a family member of a director
has a personal or financial interest in any matter coming before the
Board or a committee of the Board, that director should disclose that
interest and generally should not participate in any discussion of, or
voting on, the possible approval of any transaction impacting that
interest.324 For organizations that authorize committees, Circles,
spokes, or any other non-Board groups to make significant expenditures, the non-profit should consider crafting conflict of interest
policies covering those bodies. As part of the duty of loyalty, directors have an obligation to protect the confidentiality of private organizational information,325 and it may be that the more people who
are permitted to participate in a decision-making process, the more
likely it becomes that sensitive information may be disclosed; activist non-profits that permit many people to be involved in confidential deliberations should take steps to remind all such decision-makers of this duty, and should undertake measures to ensure that information, data, and documents are stored securely.
A related fiduciary duty that could arise as an issue in the context
of activist organizations is what some call a “dual loyalty” or “di-

323

Hazen & Hazen, supra note 294, at 380–81.
See AM. BAR ASS’N, GUIDEBOOK, supra note 306, at 43–48 (outlining best
practices regarding the duty of loyalty).
325
Id. at 49.
324
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vided allegiances”—not a conflict between a director’s personal financial interest and that of the non-profit, but a conflict between a
director’s involvement with multiple organizations that may cause
that director to have loyalties to both groups or causes. 326 Because
people who participate in one activist organization sometimes have
allegiances to multiple activist groups, activist non-profits should
consider addressing the possibility of such conflicts in an organizational conflict of interest policy and ask directors to be sensitive to
the potential for such conflicts.327
2. DUTY OF OBEDIENCE
The duty of obedience requires that directors ensure that corporate acts are lawful and not ultra vires, beyond the specified purpose
and mission of the organization.328 Although this duty rarely comes
up in court cases and is not codified in all state non-profit corporation statutes, state attorneys general with enforcement responsibilities may monitor compliance with organizational purposes and missions, chiefly at moments of major corporate transitions, like mergers and acquisitions, changes of corporate purpose, or upon dissolution.329 When a donor to an organization places restrictions on the
uses of donated funds, the duty of obedience requires that directors
make reasonable efforts to ensure compliance with those restrictions,330 and, in states that have adopted the Uniform Prudent

326

See generally CLIFFORD S. GOLDFARB, DUAL LOYALTIES ON NON-PROFIT
BOARDS: SERVING TWO MASTERS (2011), https://www.grllp.com/publications/Goldfarb_Dual_Loyalties_On_NonProfit_Boards_Final.pdf.
327
See, e.g., Policy Concerning Conflict of Interest and Divided Allegiance,
AM. CTR. PHILANTHROPY BOARD 1–3, https://www.americancp.org/pdf/ACPConflict-Interest-Statement.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2019) (distinguishing conflict-of-interest and divided allegiance policies).
328
Hazen & Hazen, supra note 294, at 388.
329
Id. at 389–90; see Sugin, supra note 292, at 899 (noting that even though
the New York not-for-profit corporation law does not describe a duty of obedience, the state attorney general finds that the duty “may be inferred” from other
provisions of the statute).
330
Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society
vs. Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1131 (2005).
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Management of Institutional Funds Act, directors must also consider
certain additional economic considerations.331
The new activist non-profits may have cause to be more concerned about the duty of obedience than conventionally structured
non-profits. In a governance model where decisions may be made
or new programs may be launched without close Board oversight,
how can an organization ensure that it does not act ultra vires—outside of the organization’s corporate purpose and mission? The new
activist non-profits may find some relief in the generally permissive
trend in the law around non-profit corporate purposes: although corporations are still not permitted to operate outside of the corporate
purposes listed in their charters, it has become increasingly common
for state non-profit statutes to permit the incorporation of a nonprofit for any lawful purpose, raising the issue of whether anything
lawful could ever be ultra vires for an entity with such a broad corporate purpose.332 Like in the context of business corporations
where similarly permissive incorporation statutes have existed since
the nineteenth century, concern about acting outside of an organization’s corporate purposes may be an old paradigm, eclipsed by judicial deference to the business judgment rule.333 For the new activist
331

UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT
FERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2006) (requiring

§ 3 (NAT’L CONthe Board to consider investment decisions in relations to the organization’s overall portfolio, the
economic circumstances at the time, and the charitable purposes of the organization and the fund).
332
Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA.
L. REV. 497, 510 (1981) (noting that the trend, even in the early 1980s, was toward
permitting non-profit incorporation for any lawful purpose); Alan R. Palmiter,
Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 469 (2010)
(arguing that the duty of obedience for non-profits “has come under attack for
limiting non-profit adaptability”). For this reason, the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, since its 1987 revision, has not recognized a non-profit duty of obedience
separate from the duties of care and loyalty. Palmiter, supra, at 469.
333
For discussions of the decline of the doctrine of ultra vires in business corporations, see, for example, JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4:7 (3d ed. 2018); CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 671
(4th ed. 2003). Still, most states continue to have ultra vires rules in their corporate
codes, permitting shareholder suits or action by a state Attorney General to enjoin
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non-profits, the duty of obedience may require a degree of reporting
the activities of relatively autonomous groupings like Circles or affinity groups to the larger body or Board and an attentiveness to the
risks of breaching this duty.
The duty of obedience also may include a general prohibition
against directing the organization to engage in illegality.334 Although this may sound like a concern for some activist non-profits,
the duty of obedience likely does not prevent an activist organization
from taking a principled stand against unjust laws or an unjust system of laws, just as the duty of loyalty for business corporations does
not prevent a corporation from openly disobeying a law in order to
challenge its validity or application.335 In the activist non-profit context, the decision to openly disobey a law as part of a campaign of
civil disobedience or direct action that supports the organization’s
goals should similarly not be considered a breach of the duty of obedience.336 Still, it is a good practice for an organization interested in
endorsing such acts to make it clear to members or others that participation in such activities is always optional and that members
might, depending on the context, risk arrest or other serious consequences for actions they decide to take.

a corporate act or dissolve a corporation, and such actions continue to be at least
periodically litigated. Adam J. Sulkowski, Ultra Vires Statutes: Alive, Kicking,
and a Means of Circumventing the Scalia Gauntlet in Environmental Litigation,
24 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 75, 103–07 (2009).
334
Palmiter, supra note 332, at 460 (noting that corporations, since their beginnings, were only allowed to engage in lawful business and that the duty of
obedience has therefore always “called on fiduciaries to not permit corporate illegality”). While this approach to the duty of obedience would make illegal acts
also ultra vires, Palmiter notes that, like the rest of the ultra vires doctrine, the
duty to not permit corporate illegality has largely “wilted away.” Id.
335
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01, cmt. g, 60–61 (1992).
336
There are surely limits to such an interpretation of the law: no matter how
noble an organization's mission, a non-profit could not use “civil disobedience”
as a shield to protect efforts to fraudulently induce people to donate to the organization.
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3. GOVERNANCE OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
The Internal Revenue Code has an additional impact on nonprofit corporate governance rules for organizations that maintain
federal tax exemption. Organizations exempt from income tax pursuant to Internal Revenue Code 501(a), including most organizations (other than private foundations and black lung benefit trusts)
described in any provision of 501(c), 527, or 4947(a)(1), must submit an annual information filing to the IRS on Form 990, 990-EZ,
or 990-N.337 Starting in 2008, the IRS redesigned Form 990, adding
a series of new questions concerning corporate governance, some
derived from legislation, and others that “place[d] new and undefined burdens on organizations.”338 These new provisions on Form
990 ask organizations about how they make governance and other
documents publicly available, conflicts of interest and interested director transactions, independent directors, document retention and
destruction policies, Board review of the Form 990, whistleblower
policies, and they impose additional documentation requirements.339
Of these new provisions, the ones that may cause concern for the
new activist non-profits are related to independent directors. To be
considered an independent director by the IRS, a director must not
be compensated in any way—including for employment—by the
same or a related organization, must not receive total compensation
or other payments of $10,000 during the organization’s tax year as
an independent contractor, and neither that person nor any of his or
her family members may be involved in a transaction with the organization.340 State corporate law in only a very few states require

337

See 2018 Instructions for Form 990 Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i990.pdf (last visited Apr. 28. 2019).
338
James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Governance
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX L. REV. 545, 568 (2010) [hereinafter Fishman, Stealth
Preemption].
339
Id. at 569–78.
340
Id. at 570.
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that a majority of non-profit directors meet this degree of independence.341 But while the IRS does require disclosure of interested directors, it only hints that it may be moving toward a Sarbanes-Oxley-style regulatory regime that more closely regulates interested directors—nowhere does the IRS limit non-profits from having a
Board comprised of non-independent directors.342 Indeed, for organizations chartered in most states, the worker self-directed non-profit
model developed by SELC could have been simplified; without the
independent director requirement imposed by California law,343
there is no legal need to have a majority-independent Board Circle
in addition to an all-staff General Circle and Advisory Board, as
SELC does.344
VI. CONCLUSION: BREAKING FROM THE
NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
The criticisms of the non-profit industrial complex may be at
their most compelling when made by activists who have been pressured to shoehorn their radical, anti-authoritarian, prefigurative politics into today’s dominant professionalized non-profit model.345

341
Id. at 572; see CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227(a) (West 2019); ME. STAT. tit. 13B, § 713-A(2) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292:6-a (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-33-27(2) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11B, § 8.13(a) (2018).
342
Scholars have criticized the IRS for even hinting at undertaking this change
without a statutory mandate to do so. Fishman, Stealth Preemption, supra note
338, at 572; see generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Independence in the
Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795, 797–98 (2007) (critiquing imposition of independent director reforms on non-profits).
343
CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227(a).
344
See SELC, Webinar on Worker Self Directed Nonprofits, supra note 116,
(arguing at 50:46–51:21 that “Board independence is considered a key safeguard
against corruption, but can it actually undermine the nonprofit’s efficacy and advancing its mission? The people with the most interest in the organization’s success are also most likely to be ‘interested persons’”).
345
See, e.g., Smith, supra note 26, at 1–2 (describing how INCITE! Women
of Color Against Violence had a grant award revoked by the Ford Foundation
because someone on Ford Foundation’s Board objected to a statement of support
for the Palestinian people on their website).
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Understandably, these activists’ criticisms of the non-profit industrial complex sometimes conflate all possible versions of non-profit
vehicles with the current norms of the professionalized non-profit
sector in the United States.346 It is important to understand U.S. nonprofit norms in their historical context. The professionalized nonprofit model—with its hierarchy, employee leadership, dependency
on grants and donations to such a degree that grantors and donors
overly influence programmatic decision-making, and tendency to
grow increasingly separate from the communities with the most at
stake in their advocacy—may be the dominant form of non-profit
organization, but this is not due to any inherent legal requirements
of the form. In fact, the non-profit corporation in the United States
developed in an earlier era, when non-profit groups were commonly
member-led, community-driven, staffed by volunteers, and—while
politically more often civic- or community-minded than radical—
often more democratic and participatory than many ostensibly “social justice” non-profits are today.347
Since the rise in prominence of the activist criticisms of nonprofit norms that followed the development of the “non-profit industrial complex” label, activist skepticism of the non-profit corporate form has continued to grow. While some activists have chosen
to work entirely outside of non-profit vehicles, such approaches are
not always ideal. Other activists have experimented with new models for non-profit organizations, aiming to take advantage of the benefits of the corporate form—limited liability, increased likelihood of
obtaining tax exemption, greater ability to enter into contracts like
commercial leases or to obtain funding like grants or loans—while
at the same time departing from professionalized non-profit norms
to try to be responsive to the criticisms of the non-profit industrial
complex.
346

See Paula X. Rojas, Are the Cops in Our Heads and Hearts?, in THE REVWILL NOT BE FUNDED, supra note 26, at 197, 207 (arguing that “it is
important to be critical of the non-profit system, [but] we do not necessarily need
to get rid of it all together. Revolutionary movements around the world use nonprofits (NGOs) as well, but they have a different relationship with them”).
347
See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
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Section VI.A briefly describes seven best practices for these
groups and, if they have them, their lawyers when considering how
to structure activist organizations in line with the models described
in this Article. Section VI.B concludes with a consideration of how
these groups fit into larger questions about prefigurative politics and
social movements.
A. Seven Best Practices for the
New Activist Non-Profits and Their Lawyers
There are activist groups experimenting with new organizational
structures around the country, and many are undertaking this work
without legal counsel or, when fortunate enough to have access to a
lawyer, without legal counsel who have thought in detail about either the variety of potential structures that activists have been developing or all the legal ramifications that result from the changes these
groups are seeking to make. Although this Article has largely focused on presenting some of the existing options for organizational
structure for these new activist non-profits, representing these
groups well requires going beyond simply counseling them on the
flexibility of non-profit corporate law and hammering out corporate
structures that seem to meet their goals. To conclude, this Article
offers seven considerations that the new activist non-profits and
their lawyers should bear in mind when working to plan and develop
these groups.
1. PLAN AHEAD FOR GROWTH
It is hard for any group to predict future growth, but because the
different structures described in this Article grow to scale very differently, it is critical to do both short- and longer-term planning. It
would likely be impossible for a worker self-directed non-profit to
have all workers meet to discuss fairly routine matters in an organization with 10,000 employees.348 Conversely, the great strength of
the swarm organization structure is its scalability, and organizations
structured using that model have the potential to become large.349
348
349

See supra Section II.A.3.
See supra notes 226–31 and accompanying text.
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The swarm organization model, however, is driven by volunteers or
members, not employees, so it is not a great choice for every group.
The new activist non-profits should try to realistically anticipate
how they think their project should grow and plan ahead to support
that expansion as they decide on organizational structures.
2. DON’T GET BOGGED DOWN IN TERMINOLOGY AND METAPHOR
Too many activist groups get sidetracked with debates over terminology, like whether to make decisions by “consent,” “consensus,” or “modified consensus,” or whether to have a “Board, “hub,”
or “core collective.” These labels matter, but they ultimately matter
less than the specific rules and policies the group adopts. Spend
more time defining specific processes than debating abstract labels
that quite often come with different connotations for different people. Similarly, do not dedicate too much time to metaphorical thinking: it is not always a good use of time to debate whether to call a
group a swarm or a hive, or to discuss whether a group that might
be part of a social movement ecosystem is more like a root or a vegetable or fertilizer. Metaphors can help people understand complicated topics at times, but developing specific goals and plans are
often a better use of a group’s time than elaborate metaphors.
3. MONITOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES
As described in Part V, groups that are exploring these new models should make sure that their Boards satisfy their fiduciary duties.
For all of the corporate forms described in this Article, one of the
commonalities that carries some legal risk is the marginalizing or
minimizing of the role of the Board. In each model, there are mechanisms that can be used to try to ensure that directors are fulfilling
their duties, but organizations should not lose sight of the importance of following through on those steps. The following are
some good practices for all of these groups to implement: having a
mechanism for Board monitoring of organizational finances; holding at least one annual Board meeting to review important organizational matters that may have been worked on by others in the organization; making sure to be reasonably informed about the subjects of
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decisions without a disabling conflict of interest; and being careful
with confidential information.350
4. GOOD STRUCTURES ARE NOT
SUBSTITUTES FOR MUTUAL RESPECT
The real-world interior lives of social change organizations can
fluctuate and be messy, driven by specific personalities and conflicts
that arise from specific contexts.351 Whatever structure a group pursues, there needs to be a focus not only on structure, but also on
having those interpersonal relationships be healthy ones, built on
collaboration, respect, and solidarity. While helping groups to manage those relationships might not always be the right role for a lawyer doing this work, lawyers for these groups must be attentive to
just how essential healthy, collaborative relationships can be to organizational strength and success. There are activist texts that discuss developing these relationships that are good starting points for
any of these groups to consult.352
5. CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING IS IMPERFECT TOO
Activists have long considered consensus to be a better decisionmaking tool than majority voting because consensus aims to maximize individual autonomy and the participation of all members of
a group.353 But consensus decision-making comes with downsides
as well. First, consensus can lead a group to inaction if members are
thinking of the process as more like a unanimous vote than a procedure for soliciting group feedback in order to modify plans so that

350

See generally Part V.
For a thoughtful reminder of the need to balance democratic processes and
the immediate material aims of communities in crisis, see generally Barbara
Bezdek, Digging into Democracy: Reflections on CED and Social Change Lawyering After #OWS, 77 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 16 (2018).
352
See generally, e.g., SEEDS FOR CHANGE, A CONSENSUS HANDBOOK: COOPERATIVE DECISION-MAKING FOR ACTIVISTS, CO-OPS AND COMMUNITIES
(2013); DELFINA VANNUCCI & RICHARD SINGER, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER:
A HANDBOOK ON COLLECTIVE PROCESS GONE AWRY (2010).
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VANNUCCI & SINGER, supra note 352, at 19.
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they become reasonably acceptable to all group members.354 When
blocks are not reserved for very rare occasions, a consensus or Consent process can destroy a group’s ability to work with any efficiency at all.355 Second, consensus decision-making can sometimes
lead to groupthink: group members may withhold good-faith objections to a proposal because they do not want to block something that
most members of the group support; the good thing about a simple
up-or-down vote is that it allows a member to quickly and easily
express doubts about a proposal without derailing something supported by nearly everyone else.356 This is not to say that majority or
supermajority voting is better than consensus, but rather that no
model for decision-making is perfect, and activist groups should
think carefully about what will work best for them and their members.
6. LEARN FROM OTHER GROUPS AND DON’T THROW OUT
THE GOOD WITH THE BAD
Activist groups that are committed to building non-profit structures that align with their values can sometimes feel like they are
starting from scratch, without any effective models on which to
build. But models for these organizations do exist; the structures described in this Article present some starting points for activist groups
exploring these frameworks. Activists should share their experiments and takeaways with one another, as many of the groups described in this Article have done. Beyond that, some of the practices
of conventionally structured, professionalized non-profits might be
revisited within the context of these new experiments with structure:
just because elected corporate officers are sometimes symptoms of
a problematic organizational hierarchy does not mean that having a
person who is elected by a majority vote to take notes at group meetings is somehow an inherently flawed idea.

354
355
356

See Haber, supra note 25, at 335.
Id.
VANNUCCI & SINGER, supra note 352, at 19–21.
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7. LAWYERS, REMEMBER MOVEMENT LAWYERING
Since the early 2000s, lawyers committed to social change lawyering have increasingly come to frame their work as “movement
lawyering,” the “representation of mobilized clients and the use of
integrated advocacy . . . [a] version of cause lawyering in which the
cause is defined and advanced by social movement leaders and constituents in dynamic processes of grassroots organization building
and community engagement.”357 This Article describes the representation of mobilized clients but a mode of lawyering that could be
interpreted to be actually quite traditional: providing legal assistance
to an organization considering whether to incorporate and how to
structure that corporate entity to meet the organization’s goals. Activist organizations do sometimes engage corporate lawyers on such
a limited, transactional basis—likely to the detriment of an organization that could benefit from a lawyer with a deeper understanding
of their activist values and political vision.
While movement lawyers can and do engage in traditional forms
of advocacy on behalf of mobilized clients, the core of the advocacy
model of movement lawyers is to break down barriers between lawyers and non-lawyers, litigation and other forms of advocacy, toward the ultimate goal of “producing more democratic and sustainable social change.”358 Movement lawyers with the corporate and
transactional legal expertise that is essential to helping movement
groups navigate these issues should not limit their work narrowly,
but should look for opportunities to further collaborate with these
groups toward precisely those goals.
B. The New Activist Non-Profits, Prefigurative Politics,
and Law and Social Movements
The relationships between non-profit organizations, social
movements, and prefigurative politics can be complicated, and arguments about them too often rely on overgeneralizations. Some un357

Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645,
1689–90.
358
Id. at 1695.
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critically accept the conventional wisdom that participatory democracy, prefigurative politics, and non-hierarchical or decentralized organizations are, at best, good-on-paper theories that ignore the real
needs of low-income communities and communities of color.359
Similar criticisms have been around since at least the 1960s.360 In
the mid-1960s, African-American activists within the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (“SNCC”) did indeed challenge
white organizational leaders who focused on internal participatory
democracy while retaining their privileged leadership roles—criticizing endless debate among the mostly-white “children of the middle class with the middle class intellectual penchant for nuance[.]”361
But to draw a straight line from SNCC to the Occupy Movement
and write off prefigurative politics entirely as disconnected from the
real struggles of communities in crisis erases the entire tradition of
women-of-color feminism, 1980s AIDS activists, 1990s Zapatistas,362 and recent environmental activism led by indigenous North
American communities,363 and ignores the work of some of the
greatest leaders of the Civil Rights Era, figures like Ella Baker and
Myles Horton, who sought to focus on local organizing while maintaining a radical, national vision for social change, and who always
“treated participatory decisionmaking both as a strategy and as an
end in itself.”364
Of course, the debates over the merits of participatory democracy that occupied many within SNCC and the New Left are more
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than fifty years old, and our political context today is radically different. In comparison to the 1960s, for even many activists in today’s political climate, the idea of a movement for meaningful social
change feels naïve: “the elevated language of hope in a systemic alternative ‘rings oddly in our ears.’”365 Today, we do not only need
“structures to more effectively organize and mobilize struggles . . . but transcending pessimism . . . needs an animating vision
as well, a utopia that is both dream and possible reality.”366 The experiments described in this Article may be some early efforts toward
such a vision, ways of developing new structures for both mobilization and developing a community that point toward that possible future. Movement lawyers familiar with the models described in this
Article—and all of their benefits, challenges, risks, and areas of concern—can collaborate with activist groups experimenting with these
models to not only support the shaping of effective organizational
structures that meet the visions of these groups, but do so in a way
that causes the fewest legal challenges for those groups as they
grow.
While many activists rightfully remain skeptical about nonprofit corporations, compliance, and tax-exemption in light of the
important criticisms of the non-profit industrial complex, innovative
activist groups around the country have been engaged in a long series of radical experiments, exploring ways that groups can take advantage of the benefits of the non-profit corporate form while avoiding many of its most problematic effects. The non-profit corporation—that old relic of our grandparents’ dusty civic association
meetings and the well-meaning community-based organizations that
grew to scale out of the radical 1960s only to sometimes become so
focused on fundraising that they lost perspective on the most essential need for political vision and community mobilization—may be,
after all, the shell in which we begin to build the new world.
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